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1. INTRODUCTION 
I.I. Motivation 
This is a report of research conducted for the purpose of evaluating the 
effectiveness of two well-known price cap schemes in meeting common regulatory 
objectives. Traditionally in the United States, regulatory methods have been of the rate-
of-return type with an aim to guarding against the undesirable natural monopoly behavior 
of profit-maximizing pricing, while still allowing for profits in degree sufficient to attract 
necessary capital investment. Given that marginal cost pricing can force negative profits 
in the presence of sufficiently large economies of scale, rate-of-return, as a way of 
attaining second-best outcomes and guaranteeing firm viability, made a compelling case 
for its position as the method of choice for regulatory authorities in the United States 
until economists of the late twentieth century began to publicize its shortcomings. Of 
course, much of the criticism stems from the fact that rate-of-return regulation generally 
requires significant auditing responsibilities of the regulator to ensure that the firm 
accurately reports all costs of production. Asymmetric familiarities with the production 
process often place the regulator in an inferior position to confidently verify or falsify the 
firm's reports. Indeed, a firm under rate-of-return may succeed in disguising excessive 
spending on nonessential goods and services (e.g., extravagant office furnishings, 
expensive dinners with clients, or frivolous research and development projects) as 
legitimate costs, thereby deceiving the regulator into believing that the firm is earning 
only a "fair" return on capital investment. Even outright fraudulent marginal cost 
reporting can escape regulatory scrutiny. Moreover, rate-of-return regulation creates 
perverse incentives for even the honest and frugally minded firm to utilize its resources in 
inefficient ways. A verch and Johnson (1962) enumerate several possible scenarios. 
Consequently, much study has been devoted to alternative price-incentive arrangements 
requiring less onerous investigative duties of the regulator. Some of these methods utilize 
a price cap designed to force a coincidence of interests between the regulator and the 
firm, i.e., as the firm maximizes profit over a set of prices restricted by the cap, the firm 
also moves in the direction of increased consumer surplus. 
We see then that the primary impetus behind the historical development of price 
caps is that since rate-of-return regulation is necessarily cost based, i.e., rates move with 
reported costs in a more or less one-to-one manner, any incentives the regulated firm may 
have for trimming costs is effectively nullified. The firm faces a very real moral hazard 
problem because cost reductions are essentially confiscated by the regulatory authority. 
Price caps, in contrast with rate-of-return, sever the link between costs and prices (at least 
during the time span between successive reviews of the price cap) because the regulator 
commits to a guaranteed price for the firm. As a result, the firm is more inclined to 
implement cost-saving production technologies, reduce nonessential and extravagant 
expenditures, and seek for more efficient organizational strategies. Periodic reviews of 
the cap can serve only the public interest by permitting at least some portion of the cost 
savings achieved by increased production efficiencies to be ultimately transferred to the 
consumer (presumably, production efficiency always increases over time). 
It is precisely these advantages of price-incentive regulation over traditional rate-
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of-return that makes our analysis here so important. However, before this report can be 
appreciated fully by the reader, some background information about the development of 
regulatory thought in the U.S. and in Great Britain must be in place. The following two 
sections of this chapter are not intended to be an exhaustive review of the extensive 
literature on the subject, but rather the author offers them as an overview of the most 
significant contributions to the present evolved understanding of incentive regulation's 
advantages over rate-of-return. 
1.2. An Overview of the Literature Related to Non-Price-Cap Regulatory 
Approaches 
The most common rate-of-return formula employed is rate-of-return on capital 
invested (return-on-output and return-on-sales are other methods used). If we assume 
only one non-capital input, L, purchased by the firm at rate w, the rate-of-return on capital 
K is (PQ- wL )! K where output Q is sold at price P. The requirement that this be less 
than some fair rate f is stated mathematically as (PQ- wL )! K ~ f . A verch and 
Johnson (1962) demonstrate that rate-of-return formulas induce the firm to substitute 
between production factors in an uneconomical fashion that is difficult for the regulatory 
agency to detect. Train (1991) succinctly verifies Averch and Johnson's claim by altering 
the above equation to PQ - wL ~ .fK and subtracting the total cost of capital (rK where r 
is the price of capital) from both sides of this inequality to obtain 
1r = PQ- wL- rK ~ (f - r )K. Allowed profit for the firm is therefore a linear function 
of capital and is maximized at a capital-labor ratio higher than that corresponding 
to the feasible profit maximum. Hence social cost is not minimized at the output it 
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selects. Additional negative aspects of rate-of-return as listed by Train include: 
1. The potential for higher prices and lower outputs compared to the unregulated 
outcome 
2. The inability to induce the firm to expand output into the inelastic portion of 
demand. 
Moreover, A verch and Johnson's research determined that firms operating under rate-of-
retum often tend to expand into other markets, even if they operate at a long run loss in 
those markets. A firm might build up its rate base by selling competitive outputs at a 
price below marginal cost. Such behavior can result when a fully-associated cost basis is 
employed for the rate-of-return calculation. As a result, these peripheral markets can 
actually become less competitive. 
Cost incentive mechanisms are designed to induce the firm to move toward 
efficient prices and outputs over time. A condition of quasi-optimal prices (a second-best 
solution forced by the imposition of a revenue requirement) first appears in Ramsey's "A 
Contribution to the Theory of Taxation" (1927) where the author examines the issue of 
determining the most efficient set of prices that will allow for the financing of fixed 
production costs which are not covered by marginal cost pricing. Ramsey determined that 
unit prices for different goods should exceed marginal costs the most when demand is 
inelastic (provided cross-elasticities of demand are zero), and the least when demand is 
elastic. Such "inverse elasticity" pricing requires that consumers with the highest 
willingness-to-pay contribute the most toward the fixed costs. Baumol and Bradford 
(1970) go on to derive equivalent necessary conditions of "quasi-optimal" pricing by 
abstracting from a hypothetical economy where all industry is nationalized and where a 
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central planning agency is dedicated to the maximization of social welfare. The term 
"quasi-optimal" is employed to highlight the requirement that government revenues must 
suffice to cover all deficits of the individual firms that constitute the economy. 
A well-known cost incentive mechanism was proposed by Vogelsang and 
Finsinger (1979). The basic assumptions of VF regulation are a convex welfare function 
and decreasing ray-average costs. The process repeatedly drives the firm in the direction 
of efficient prices of ever-increasing consumer surplus even though the regulator knows 
virtually nothing about production costs. Hence the information asymmetry problem is 
effectively dealt with. The mechanism essentially takes the prices, outputs, and costs 
incurred by the firm in a given period of time to constrain the firm in its selection of 
prices for the next period. Specifically, the firm's prices in period t when multiplied by 
the quantities corresponding to these prices from the previous period cannot exceed the 
previous period's total costs. Mathematically stated, the set of feasible prices for the firm 
in period t, t E N, is given by R, = {p I q1_1 • p :'.S: C(q1_1 )} • Consequently, the firm is 
encouraged in any period to exploit the potential for cost decreases so as to increase that 
period's profit. The profit is then turned over to the consumer in the next period. Note 
that the regulator does not need to know the demand and cost curve parameters, only the 
demands and costs actually occurring in each period. Market prices and quantities along 
with explicitly reported costs substantiated by invoices, wage payments and capital 
accounting is all that is required by the regulator. 
A severe criticism of VF regulation was presented in a paper by Sappington 
(1980) in which he explains how the single-product monopoly with constant costs might 
be tempted to subvert the process by wasting inputs in any given period prior to reaching 
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the equilibrium so that higher prices will be allowed in the next period. Any costs 
reported but not actually incurred can be retained by the firm as profits. A non-VF 
regulated firm will almost certainly find it advantageous to waste if it is expecting VF 
regulation to be imposed in the very near future. Additionally, overstatement of costs 
under VF can slow the inevitable convergence to equilibrium. Further, equilibrium can 
occur at a price above the true average costs enabling the firm to earn positive profits 
indefinitely. Nevertheless, Sappington shows that a monopoly firm subject to VF 
regulation will not engage in pure waste if the cost of capital differs from the allowed rate 
ofreturn. 
1.3. An Overview of the Literature Related to Price-Cap Regulation 
Stephen Littlechild of Great Britain is largely to be credited with making the first 
politically compelling case for regulation by price caps when during the time of his report 
on the subject in 1983 to the British Department of Industry the British government was 
considering the privatization of much of its public services. Littlechild contended that 
prices rather than profits should be the principal concern of regulatory authorities. He 
pointed to systemic cost inefficiencies in the rate-of-return approaches that typified U.S. 
regulatory arrangements. As a result of his arguments, the British government began to 
apply price caps to British Telecom and other privatized monopolies. Since then, price 
caps have increasingly displaced rate-of-return approaches as the method of choice by 
regulators in many countries including the United States for setting rates for public utility 
and telecommunication services. A price cap for a one-product I multi-market firm is 
simply a price ceiling on the weighted average price of the firm's product over all 
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markets supplied. Additionally, a typical price cap incorporates the provision that the 
price ceiling increase from one period to the next by no more than CPI-X percent1 where 
CPI is the Consumer Price Index and Xis a predetermined number, referred to as the "X-
factor", included to encourage production efficiency. With prices no longer directly tied 
to production costs, the firm obtains an incentive for cost reduction with the benefits of 
engaging in high-risk ventures and inefficient operating practices greatly diminished. 
Moreover, pricing flexibility is greatly enhanced. Hence, price caps have incentive 
properties that more closely reflect those of a competitive marketplace than does rate-of-
retum. Typically, a price cap is set for only a fixed number of years at the end of which it 
is reset so as to transfer to consumers a surplus from any increased production 
efficiencies. The obvious problem of determining an appropriate X-factor attends the 
CPI-X formula however. This is an issue explored in several recent papers which, 
nevertheless, is separate from the main concern of this particular study - to examine the 
technical merits between certain well-known, structurally different price cap approaches. 
For this reason, the price cap formulas discussed in the chapters following do not include 
the CPI-X adjustment. 
Acton and Vogelsang (1989) list the following characteristics of price cap 
regulation: 
1. The regulator sets the price cap and the regulated firm must price at or 
below this cap. Any profits earned may be retained by the firm. 
2; The price cap may be adjusted over time. Input prices, demands, and 
profits will probably be used to adjust the cap over time. 
3. For multi-output monopolies, the regulator may specify a price cap that is 
1 The retail price index (RPI) minus 3 percent was initially used in the regulation of British Telecom. 
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essentially a price index of the outputs. The firm can adjust prices of the 
goods up or down so long as a weighted average of these prices remains 
below the cap. 
Lehman and Weisman (2004) describe certain advantages to price caps including: 
I. Price-cap regulation provides the incumbent firm with increased pricing 
flexibility necessary to compete more effectively with new market 
entrants. 
2. Price caps offer rate stability that in many cases improves upon historical 
trends. 
In contrast, Lehman and Weisman add the insightful comment that imposition of 
price caps in place of rate-of-return regulation involves the exchange of one moral hazard 
problem for another. Under traditional rate-of-return regulation, the moral hazard 
problem entails the firm failing to provide service at least-cost because it is fully 
compensated by the regulator for the costs that it incurs. On the other hand, a price-cap 
regime that permits no earnings sharing involves a moral hazard of temptation for the 
regulator to induce excessive competitive entry. Lehman and Weisman provide empirical 
evidence that regulators in price cap states of the U.S. indeed adopt more liberal 
competitive entry policies in comparison with regulators in rate-of-return states ( or 
regulators in states requiring earnings sharings with price caps). 
Liston (1993) observes similarities and differences between rate-of-return and 
price cap regulation, and notes that information requirements for both are often 
essentially the same. Also, because of incentives to minimize costs, a decrease in product 
quality and a retardation of quality innovations can accompany price caps. Further, when 
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there is considerable uncertainty about cost fluctuations, the regulator may need to set 
prices so high that consumer surplus is greatly diminished and excessive deadweight 
losses are created. Generally, to ensure viability the regulator must set the cap above 
perceived costs. As a result, potential cross-subsidization across markets by the 
multiproduct firm may require the regulator to guard against predatory pricing of 
competitive services. Of course, this requires that firm products be separable into 
regulated and non-regulated groups. Alternatively, Liston notes that where partial entry in 
a regulated industry is possible, price caps may not really be advantageous to rate-of-
return because the caps are likely to be binding upon increased competition, and thus 
ineffective once the firm successfully petitions the regulatory board. 
The Federal Communication Commission implemented one of the first price cap 
schemes in the U.S. in its regulation of AT&T in 1989. While the cap required that 
annual price increases could not exceed a rate of 3 percent less than the inflation rate as 
measured by the Gross National Product Price Index, it nevertheless placed no limit upon 
the rate-of-return AT&T could earn during any year under the cap. Since that time, where 
the possibility of windfall profits for a regulated firm exists because of an excessively 
high level for the cap, the imposition of a sliding scale is often called for by the regulator. 
Braeutigam and Panzar (1993) note that a common sliding scale mechanism employed by 
many individual states in their regulation of the local exchange carriers (LEC's) resulting 
from the breakup of AT&T required that the LEC's refund a portion of earnings that 
result from a rate-of-return in excess of 13 percent. Other multi-tiered approaches, where 
the earnings portion to be rebated increases with the degree to which the rate-of-return 
exceeds 13 or some other target percentage, have been utilized. While sliding scales 
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reintroduce some of the unattractive accounting and monitoring features of rate-of-return, 
Braeutigam and Panzar are nevertheless sanguine about the advantages of sliding-scale 
price caps. They mention that in addition to improving the adversarial nature of the 
regulatory process, sliding scales expand the scope of bargaining between the firm and 
the regulator by making the productivity offsets as subjects of explicit bargaining rather 
than treating them as knowable data as is erroneously done under rate-of-return. 
Currier (2005) notes that three types of pure price-cap regulation have received 
the bulk of attention in recent regulatory literature. These are: 
1. Average Revenue (AR) 
2. Laspeyres (L) 
3. Average Revenue Lagged (ARL). 
p 0 = (p 0 ,p0 ) is the price cap vector. Cowan (1997) demonstrates that, in general, 
steady-state prices under AR are inefficient, and the steady-state welfare can be less than 
that which would prevail in the absence of regulation. Under L the firm satisfies 
I t-1 
p 1• q p 1 :s; 1. As Lis predicated on logic similar to the VF regulation discussed pt- ·q pt-
earlier (period t - 1 revenue is used in place of the period t - 1 costs), the myopic firm 
converges to efficient prices. Under ARL the firm selects prices in period t satisfying 
I t-1 
p O • q p _1 :s; 1. Hence ARL is a combination of AR and L. ARL utilizes a cap ( p0 , p ·q pt 
where p 0 = (p 0 ,p0 )) on the weighted average prices of the firm's product during each 
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period of regulation where the previous period's demand quantities are used as the 
weights. An obvious advantage of ARL over AR regulation is that while AR regulation 
requires the regulator to forecast demand quantities in advance and have in place a 
mechanism for either the firm or consumers to be compensated in case the forecasts are 
in error, ARL has no such requirement because it utilizes lagged quantities. Another 
advantage of ARL regulation over AR is that consistently myopic behavior by the firm 
leads to steady-state price vectors that are efficient. However, enthusiasm for ARL based 
on this fact must be tempered by the knowledge that a firm can instead undermine the 
imposed price cap by forgoing profit in an early period in order to achieve the global 
profit-maximum in some later period. Such strategic behavior results in the firm selecting 
prices for which consumer surplus is reduced and firm revenue is increased from that 
which probably existed under the pre-ARL regime. Alternatively, any strategic behavior 
performed under L regulation must lead only to increased consumer surplus, a fact the 
research reported in chapter four of this paper has utilized. 
Bradley and Price (1988) compare efficiency properties ofL against AR for 
industries in the United Kingdom. The AR approach as imposed upon British Gas and the 
British Airports Authority is shown to be clearly inefficient. In contrast, the L approach 
as applied to British Telecom is shown to be clearly superior as leading to efficient 
prices. They demonstrate that in a two-market setting with identical associated marginal 
costs of production, AR results in a higher price in the more inelastic demand market 
compared to Ramsey pricing at the same profit level. Additionally, for identical product 
demands across both markets, price will be higher than the corresponding Ramsey price 
at the same profit level in the market with higher associated marginal costs, and lower in 
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the less costly market. 
Sappington and Sibley (1992) demonstrate how intertemporal linkages resulting 
from calculating average revenue in each period by using the firm's sales in the previous 
period can provide incentives for the firm to engage in strategic nonlinear pricing to 
undermine an ARL price cap. The example of the Federal Communications 
Commission's price cap regulation of AT&T is employed to show how current sales, 
expanded by setting low current usage prices, can in turn permit larger entry fees in a 
subsequent period. The larger entry fees outweigh the consumer surplus derived from the 
increased sales. As a consequence, aggregate welfare may very well decline. 
Currier (2005) demonstrates the possibility of ARL price cap manipulation by a 
firm whose product demand functions satisfy the following reasonable desirability 
property: 
(D) If {pn} is a sequence of price vectors converging to p (i.e., pn ---+ p) where only 
P; = o, then qi (Pn )---+ +oo . 
The firm may still achieve the global profit-maximum provided the price cap is set above 
the average revenue that corresponds to this maximum and the firm is willing to sacrifice 
some profit in the first period ofregulation. A purpose of this research has been to 
determine whether any like strategic behavior can occur under ARL given the presence of 
linear demand functions that necessarily preclude the desirability assumption. As demand 
parameters commonly vary little if at all across the set of price vectors assumed by a 
regulated firm, this seems to be a particularly important question and one whose 
resolution may yet provide insights into the nonlinear situation. Any demonstration of 
12 
how strategic behavior can occur under linear demand functions is an additional 
indictment against the wisdom of employing ARL regulation toward the goal of 
protecting consumer surplus. However, as it is unlikely that ARL will be completely 
relegated to the dustbin of history any time soon, the matters of concealment and 
detection of strategic behavior will certainly continue to be topics of interest for the 
foreseeable future. Accordingly, an additional aim ofthis study is to delimit observable 
signs of ARL price cap manipulation for which the regulator may be on the alert. 
The possibility for manipulation of L regulation in particular and tariff basket 
approaches in general to the benefit of the firm but detriment to the consumer is 
demonstrated by Law (1997). The firm via adjusting revenue shares (weight 
manipulation) in the period immediately preceding L regulation can position itself in the 
first period under L to reap a higher profit than that intended by the regulator. Elsewhere 
in this paper we discuss Law's results as they apply to the one-product I two-market firm. 
In a related paper, Foreman (1996) provides specific conditions under which weight 
manipulation within a two-period I L-regulation window occurs and proposes a particular 
weighting scheme that eliminates the incentives for strategic behavior. Foreman 
illustrates how deadweight losses resulting from manipulation increase with demand 
elasticity and how profits are affected. He offers the following insightful rationale for 
two-period strategic behavior under revenue-share weighting-scheme price caps: "The 
key intuition is that by pricing one of the services at zero, the firm can drive one of the 
period-two weights to zero and thereby create infinite "leverage" with which to charge 
higher period-two prices." 
Cowan (1997) compares allocative efficiency properties of the AR, ARL and L 
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approaches and proves the following: 
1. The firm prefers ARL to Laspeyres regulation. 
2. With ARL regulation consumer surplus is higher in period 1 than with 
equal prices, but lower in the steady state. 
3. Steady-state prices when the firm is myopic satisfy the necessary 
condition for efficiency. Profits are higher, consumer surplus is lower, and 
welfare is higher than with equal prices. 
4. Under binding ARL regulation and with a positive discount factor, steady-
state prices that are not equal are inefficient. 
5. With marginal costs that vary across markets, steady-state welfare under 
ARL can be below that obtained with no regulation if the price cap is 
below at least one cost level. 
One aspect of this paper is to focus on Cowan's assertions as they pertain to ARL and L 
regulation of a one-product I multi-market monopoly firm operating with linear demands 
and constant marginal costs of production. Some refinements of his conclusions in this 
particular context will be obtained. 
1.4. Focus of Research 
Because of Average Revenue regulation's well-known weakness of producing 
allocatively inefficient steady-state outcomes, we set AR aside and devote the remaining 
chapters of this study to a comparative analysis of Average-Revenue-Lagged and 
Laspeyres price incentive approaches with respect their susceptibilities to being 
manipulated by a strategic firm. Further, myopic behavior within ARL and L under 
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certain realistic demand and cost conditions is explored to give a more thorough contrast 
between the two. 
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2. STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR UNDER A VERA GE-REVENUE-LAGGED 
REGULATION 
2.1. Strategic Behavior Under Average-Revenue-Lagged (ARL) Regulation 
(Linear Product Demands and Constant Marginal Costs) 
The objective of this section is to determine if deficiencies exist for Average-
Revenue-Lagged regulation as applied to single-product I multimarket monopolies when 
product demands are linear and marginal costs are constant. Specifically, is the price cap 
set under ARL with linear demands and constant marginal costs susceptible to being 
undermined by the monopoly firm? The simplifying assumptions on demands and 
marginal costs are in fact realistic for any situation in which prices can feasibly vary 
little, and they do allow us to begin our examination of price cap deficiencies within a 
somewhat tractable context. 
Our question here is important because manipulation of the ARL price cap comes 
only at the expense of total consumer surplus. For a product sold in only one market, the 
consumer surplus V corresponding to the price Pi where demand is given by 
q, - ap1 + b is v(pi)- - ~ ( aP, 2 + 2bp1 + b: )- This expression is obtained by 
multiplying one-half by the base aPi +b and the height _'!!..__Pi of the shaded triangle in 
a 
figure 1. 
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p 
q 
Figure 1. Consumer surplus triangle given a linear demand function. 
Consumer surplus is therefore a quadratic function of price. It follows that the consumer 
surplus corresponding to the n-dimensional price vector p = (p1, p 2 , ••• , Pn) for demand 
functions qi = aipi + bi where i = 1, 2, ... , n is given by: 
(1) 
which is C 2 and convex since the Hessian matrix of V(p), which is 
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-a1 0 0 
0 0 H(p)= -a2 , is positive definite. We are assuming zero cross-price 
0 0 
0 0 -an 
elasticities of demands between markets. For n = 2 the consumer surplus function is a 
paraboloid having domain {(Pt, p 2 ) I O ~ P; ~ -b; I a; , i = 1, 2} and possessing a family 
of concentric elliptically-shaped iso-surplus curves of common eccentricity and 
orientation2 centered at (- f!L, _ !!J__) (figure 2). An explanation of the term eccentricity 
a1 a2 
as used here is presented in Appendix A. In general, the consumer surplus function is 
monotone decreasing in any price P; over its domain. Additionally, total differentiation 
of (1) gives the slope of any iso-surplus in the A, p 2 -plane as: 
(2) 
Equivalently, the gradient of V associated with p is: 
(3) 
This, of course, is simply a re-statement of Roy's identity with the assumption of 
independence between consumer surplus and income. 
2 Alternatively, we could apply the term "homothetic" to this set of elliptically-shaped curves. Two curves 
are homothetic if they are related by a geometric expansion or contraction. A similarity transformation 
preserving orientation relates any two curves in a homothetic family. 
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form: 
or: 
V 
iso-surplus 
curves 
Figure 2. Parabolic consumer surplus function over the price plane. 
The firm's profit function is 1r(p) = p · q(p )- C[q(p)]. For n prices it takes the 
n 
1r(p)= -F + L(p; -c;)q;(p;) 
i=l 
n 
1r(p)=-F+ I(P; -c;)(a;P; +b;) 
i=l 
giving for n = 2: 
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(4) 
(5) 
where we have assumed constant marginal costs c1, c2 of production and fixed cost F . 
This function is C 2 , concave, and maximized at some unique price vector p •. Moreover, 
the slope of any iso-profit in the Pi, p 2 -plane is: 
(7) 
Expanding and completing the square in Pi and p 2 allows us to rewrite the iso-profit 
locus equation for 1r = k in the standard form: 
(8) 
So for any profit level 1r = k there is a corresponding iso-profit ellipse centered at 
the global profit-maximum price vector: 
(9) 
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implies an important result; the family of iso-profit curves is also elliptically-shaped, 
concentric and of common eccentricity and orientation. Of course, the global profit 
maximum p • may be obtained also by differentiating the profit function (6) with respect 
to Pt and p 2 • Substitution of (9) into (5) gives the maximum profit attainable for the 
firm as: 
(10) 
Additionally, substitution of (9) into (1) yields the consumer surplus corresponding to the 
global profit maximum: 
(11) 
Equating the expression for the iso-profit slope with that for the iso-surplus slope 
gives the following linear equation for the set of efficient price vectors in the p 1 , p 2 -
plane: 
(12) 
This equation also represents the line connecting the center of the iso-profit family with 
the center of the iso-surplus family. For purposes of the discussion which follows, we 
define E to be the set of efficient price vectors in the interior of the domains for v(p) and 
1r(p), i.e., 
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2.2. The Mechanics of Average-Revenue-Lagged Regulation 
Denoting prices immediately before imposition of ARL regulation by 
pr = (p; , ... ,p;) and defining social welfare as the sum of consumer surplus and profit 
(i.e., W(p) = V(p )+ 1r(p)) provides a starting point and rationale for the first step in the 
ARL process. Here we assume that pr is a zero-profit price vector to which the firm has 
been driven under some inefficient rate-of-return regulatory scheme. 
Imposition of ARL regulation requires that the firm immediately transition from 
pr to an equal-price vector p 0 = (p 0 , ••• , p0 ) where p0 (called the price cap) is at most 
the weighted average of the pre-ARL prices p;, ... , p; using the demand quantities 
q;, ... , q; as the weights, i.e., 
(13) 
and at least as large as the length of the equal-price vector contained in the iso-profit 
curve that passes through pr. Letting TC+ = {p I TC(p) > TC(pr )} ' v+ = {p I V(p) > v(pr )} 
and 11+ ={PER; J Pi = p 2 = · · · = Pn}, we see that p0 is selected by the regulator so as 
to allow for an immediate increase in welfare over that existing at pr because 
p E 11+ n TC+ n v+ (See figure 3 for n = 2, and observe that for n = 2 the set 11+ is simply 
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the 45 degree line in quadrant I). Most significantly, the consumer and the firm are 
immediately better off. 
11+ 
iso-surplus 
through P 
r 
- iso-profit through P 
r 
Figure 3. Region for the initial level of the price cap. 
Now during the first period of ARL regulation, the firm is allowed to adjust its 
prices to any p 1 where the average revenue for the firm at p 1 ( each price in the average 
being weighted by its corresponding element in the demand vector q O ) is at most equal 
to the price cap p0 • We are of course assuming that the regulator can observe these 
demands. Mathematically we may write: 
(14) 
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( AR 1 denotes the weighted average revenue for period 1) giving: 
(15) 
and thus implying that p1 must lie on or beneath the plane containing the point p 0 that is 
just tangent to the iso-surplus surface passing through p O • For the binding case ( p • is 
above the tangent plane), p1 will be on the tangent plane itself. At p1 the regulator 
observes the demand vector q1 and restricts the selection of a period 2 price vector p 2 by 
requiring that p 2 lie on or beneath the plane that contains the point p 0 and is 
perpendicular to the demand vector q1• Roy's identity guarantees that this plane is 
parallel to the iso-surplus through p 1 at p 1 • This step demonstrates the recursive aspect 
of the ARL process. In any period t, the myopic firm is expected to search for a p' that 
solves the following problem P: 
(P) Maximize 1r(p1 ) subject to {p 1 - p0 )· q(pt-1 )= -(p' - p0 )· vv(p'-1 )~ O. 
p' 
Essentially, the average revenue at p' will be less than or equal to the price cap p0 
where the prices in the average-revenue quotient are weighted by the demands noted in 
the previous period, hence the label - Average-Revenue-Lagged regulation. 
The Lagrangian for this problem is: 
(16) 
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and Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions for a solution are: 
V n-(pt) = }} q(pt-1) (17) 
A! l(Po _pt)· q(pt-1 )j = O (18) 
(19) 
The desired price vector pt is represented by a unique point of tangency between the 
constraint plane and the highest iso-profit attainable because 1r(p) is strictly concave. 
The firm will attain the global profit maximum p * in period t when }.,1 = 0. Moreover, 
binding ARL results for .. t > 0 giving the period t constraint (pt - p0 )· q(pt-1) = 0 as 
illustrated in figure 4. 
slope= 
-q1(Pt)/q2(P1 ) 
, 1· iso-surplus 
\ curve 
' 
',, J;(' 
' 
iso-profit 
curve 
~+ 
period t constraint (pt _Po)· q(pt-1) = O 
period t + 1 constraint (pt+I _po)· q(pt) = Q 
Figure 4. Average-Revenue-Lagged regulation. 
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Note that steady-state variables ps, As, and qs = q(ps) imply: 
y7 n-(ps) = As qs 
xl(Po - PS )·qs J= 0 
(17') 
(18') 
(19') 
It follows that a global profit-maximizing price vector p • is attainable as a steady state 
by the firm operating under binding ARL regulation with price cap p 0 , given that all 
demand functions are linear, only if it satisfies: 
(p 0 - p*). vv(p* )= f (p 0 -p; X-a;p; -b;}= O. (20) 
i=l 
Geometrically, since (p - p *) · V v(p ·) = 0 is the equation of the plane tangent to an 
iso-suplus at p *, the angle between the vectors VV(p *) and p * p0 must be exactly 90 
degrees. While for any p * to be attainable under ARL the price cap must satisfy 
p0 2:'.: p* =AR*, we can now say that if p* is a steady state and the ARL constraint is 
binding, then p0 = p* = AR* (Appendix B demonstrates how p* can be obtained from 
the parameters a1 , a2 , b1 , b2 , c1 , and c2 ). This is surely a point of primary concern for a 
firm allowed to influence the setting of the cap. See figure 5. 
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~+ 
iso-surplus 
• 
-0 -* p =p through P 
Pi 
Figure 5. Geometric restriction on the ARL price cap vector 
in order for the global profit maximum to be a steady state. 
2.3. Strategic Behavior Under ARL Attaining p • as a Steady State in Period 2 
(Linear Demands and Constant Marginal Costs) 
Consider now a firm whose price cap is set at p O where p * is above ~ + • The 
slope of the line containing p 0 and tangent to the iso-suplus curve through p 0 is 
0 
m --2-L= I - O 
q2 
a1po + h1 
---- , giving the equation for this tangent line as 
a2Po + h2 
(21) 
This is the period 1 ARL constraint boundary. Now Currier (2005) has demonstrated that 
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under desirability assumptions (D) the ARL regulated firm may attain p • as a steady 
state in the second period of ARL regulation and thus essentially undermine the price cap 
p 0 provided it satisfies p' ~ p0 (figure 6). Although in theory the regulator could ensure 
against this circumstance by setting p 0 < min (p;, p;), it is extremely unlikely for the 
regulator to know the components of p; . The success of strategic behavior under a price 
cap p O satisfying p* ~ p0 when demands are linear and marginal costs are constant is 
guaranteed by Proposition 1 below. Observe firstly that to achieve p • in period 2 the 
firm can utilize the fact that the slope of the line connecting p O with p • is 
satisfying: 
a1p; + b1 _ a1 (2a2p0 + b2 - a2c2 ) 
- a2p~ + b2 - a2 (2a1p0 + b1 - a1c1 J · 
Accordingly, it will first solve: 
for p;. Doing so yields: 
(22) 
(23) 
1 _ 2a1a/(p0 )3(a1 +ai}-a1a2 (p 0 )2(a1(a2c2 -b2 )+a2 (a2c2 -4b1 -5b2 )) = 
Pi - a1a2 (p 0 (a1(a2 (c1 -c2 )-b2 )+a2b1 )+a1b2c1 -a2b1ci} ~ 
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+ a2p0 (a2b1 2 - a1 (a2 (b1 (c1 + c2 ) + 2b2c2 )- b2 (3b1 + 4b2 )) ) = 
• l 
-b2 (a1 (a2 (b1c1 + b2c2 )-b2 2 )- a2b/) 3 
· 1 . 
Substituting this expression for p: in (21) and solving produces p~ . 
• p 
-· p 
iso-surplus 
curves 
p' 
~+ 
Figure 6. The possibility of p* < p0 < p'. A requirement 
for undermining the price cap. 
2.3.1. Proposition 1 
(24) 
Assume linear demands and binding ARL regulation with p* :s; p 0 • If the firm is 
allowed to price initially at the vector (p*, p*) and select any p 1 satisfying the period 1 
3 Obtained by use of the computer algebra system Derive. 
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constraint, it can achieve p • as a steady state in period 2 of ARL regulation. 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
This proposition follows from the fact that the family of iso-surplus curves is 
concentric and of common eccentricity and orientation (homothetic ). Therefore any ray 
emanating from the family center and intersecting two curves in the family will form 
congruent corresponding angles with lines tangent to these curves at the given 
intersection points. A proof of this fact is presented in Appendix C. In particular, the line 
passing through (- !!J_, _ !!J._J and p • intersects any nonparallel line containing (_p* , p" ) 
a1 a2 
at a point p' where the slope of the iso-surplus through p 1 equals the slope of the line 
segment connecting p • and (p• , p0 ) • See figure 7. 
Now if the firm accepts its price cap at _p0 = p*, and it lets p 1 be the point at 
which the period 1 constraint intersects the line through (-!!i,_!!J._J and p 0 (i.e., set E), 
a1 a2 
then the period 2 constraint line will pass through the price vector p • and be tangent to 
the iso-surplus curve through p • because p • is an efficient price vector. Substitution of 
_p0 for _p0 in (24) will give p:. Substitution of the resulting expression for p: in (21) 
will produce p~. 
Finally, p * is a steady state price vector because (17'), (18 '), and (19') are 
satisfied for ps = p • , ,1,• = 0 , and _p0 = p 0 • 
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Figure 7. Congruent angle property allows for the global profit 
maximum to be achievable in period 2 of ARL regulation. 
While price vectors positioned on the period 1 constraint further from 11+ than 
the price vector p 1 given by (24) and (21) may produce a period 2 constraint rotated 
beyond p • thus also making p • assumable in period 2, the profit associated with any of 
these must be less than that for this particular p 1 • Hence, the firm desirous of achieving 
p • in period 2, while sacrificing as little profit as possible in period 1, will follow the 
course of action specified above. 
* 2.3.2. An Example of Strategic Behavior Under ARL Attaining p as a Steady State 
in Period 2 (Linear Demands and Constant Marginal Costs) 
Consider a monopolist who sells its product in two different markets with 
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independent linear demands: q1 = -5p1 + 20 in market 1, and q2 = -6p2 + 40 in market 
2. Also, the cost of production for the firm is given by C = q1 + 3q2 + 16.1369. Equation 
(9) gives the global profit maximum for this firm as p • = (p;, p;) = (2.5000,4.833 3) 
producing the corresponding demand vector q* = (q; ,q;)= (7.5000, 11.0000). 
Now suppose that previous to imposition of ARL regulation the firm has been 
constrained to operate at the price vector pr= (p; ,p; )= (3.91, 3.89) by some rate-of-
return regulatory scheme. It can be shown that since the demand functions produce the 
demand vector qr = (q; ,q; )= (0.45, 16.66) then pr is a zero-profit price vector. 
r r + r r 
Additionally, the average revenue at pr is calculated as ARr = Pi q1 p 2 q2 = 3.8905. q; +q; 
If ARL regulation is suddenly imposed on the firm, it must accept a price cap 
p 0 = (p 0 ,p0 ) on its product where p0 ~ ARr. Suppose, for the sake of illustration, 
p 0 = 3.8874 which is also the value for p* (figure 8). This is a realistic value for a price 
cap because it still allows the firm to earn a non-negative profit at its initial ARL 
regulated price vector p 0 ( n{p0 ) = 0.2867 > 0 ). We will now proceed to show that the 
firm will be able to achieve p • as a steady state in period 2 and thus undermine the price 
cap even though p • is actually unattainable in period 1. 
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\ ~+ 
p * (2.500, 4.833) / 
p 1(1.784, 3.958) 
I / 
p'(3.91, 3.89) 
period 1 constraint 
iso-surplus 
through P 
r 
iso-surplus 
1 
through P 
Figure 8. Example of strategic behavior attaining p • in period 2 
of binding ARL regulation. 
To demonstrate, we firstly recognize that the period 1 constraint line equation is 
given by 0.0338p: + p~ = 4.0186. Accordingly, the firm may move to any new price 
vector p 1 whose coordinates satisfy this equation. Suppose the firm selects 
p 1 =(p:,p;)=(I.784,3.958) thus producing q1 =(q:,q;)=(ll.079,16.250). Then since 
vv(p1 ) = (- q: ,-q~) we can obtain the slope of the period 2 constraint as 
l l .079 d 1 d h . d 2 . . m period 2 = - an consequent y pro uce t e peno constramt equat10n 16.250 
0.6818p: + Pi =6.5379. Observethatthecoordinatesoftheglobalprofitmaximum p' 
satisfy this new constraint even though p • lies beyond the period 1 constraint. Moreover, 
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= (2(-5)(2.500)+20-(-5)(1), 2(-6X4.833)+40-(-6)(3)) = (o, o). 
Cowan (1997) asserts, "With ARL regulation consumer surplus is higher in period 
1 than with equal prices, but lower in steady state." The period 1 increase in consumer 
surplus from v(p 0 ) = 23.205 to v(p1 )=34.287 results from the fact that the iso-surplus 
passing through p O , whose slope at p O equals the slope of the period 1 constraint, is 
convex. Additionally, v(p • )= 15.712 < v(p 0 )= 23.205 comports with the other half of 
Cowan' s assertion. That imposition of ARL regulation can ultimately prove inimical to 
the regulator's goal of improving consumer welfare is also demonstrated here because 
v(p ·) = 15.708 < v(pr )= 23.150. Finally, this example illustrates that it is entirely 
possible to have both V(pr) > V(p *) and ARr > AR* simultaneously true. 
2.4. Existence and Uniqueness of a Steady-State Price Vector for any Price Cap 
Under ARL (Linear Demands and Constant Marginal Costs) 
Now we see that for linear demands and constant marginal costs each price-cap 
vector will have exactly one steady-state price vector associated with it. A one-to-one 
correspondence between vectors in 1'!!/ and elements in the set E is guaranteed by the 
linearity of each set and the congruency property of corresponding angles referred to in 
the proof of Proposition 1 (figure 9). If a price-cap vector p 0 had more than one steady-
state price vector associated with it, the line segments connecting each steady-state price 
vector to the price-cap vector could not be parallel. However, this would imply that the 
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angles formed by the set of efficient price vectors and each of these line segments could 
not be congruent thus violating our congruency property. 
pejjicient 
' 
' 
efficient (~ b1 /a1 ,-b2 / a2 ) ~ 
' ', I 
' ', - ""1' 
' 
' 
' 
(po ,po) 
(po ,po) 
11+ 
iso-surplus curves 
Figure 9. One-to-one relationship between price cap vectors and 
efficient price vectors. 
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2.5. Concealment and Detection of Strategic Behavior Under ARL Regulation 
(Linear Demands and Constant Marginal Costs) 
Although we shall see that profit maximization behavior over all periods of 
regulation (consistently myopic behavior) may enable the firm operating under linear 
demands and constant marginal costs to converge over time to the global profit-maximum 
price vector, normally a firm must behave strategically by forgoing some profit in at least 
one period in order to attain p* within afinite total number of periods. Generally 
speaking, for the firm to apply Proposition 1 in this quest it must deceive the regulator 
into thinking that the required p 1 maximizes period 1 profit. The most common approach 
is to misrepresent marginal costs in period 1. For the regulator to have any hope of 
verifying or falsifying the reported marginal costs it must have another independent 
relationship involving marginal costs with which to work. If the firm anticipated ARL 
regulation while operating at pr and was able to misreport either profit or fixed costs, 
then such devising would preclude the regulator from evaluating the profit function at pr 
to obtain any independent information here. Likewise, if the firm can misreport profit or 
fixed cost at p 0 , it successfully foils any like attempt by the regulator to employ the 
profit function at this price vector. In fact, if the firm can misreport values for all of four 
parameters - namely, marginal cost of producing the good for market #1, marginal cost 
of producing the good for market #2, profit, and fixed cost - then there is an 
indeterminancy in any systematic approach to verifying any reported values for these 
parameters by applying the profit function to only the three vectors pr, p 0 , and p 1 • The 
problem is made worse for the regulator if it is not a given that marginal costs are 
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constant over all assumed prices. Hence, the firm expecting imminent ARL regulation 
while operating at pr may be successful in evading detection of any strategic behavior 
through at least the first full period of regulation. The firm can position itself to achieve 
p • in period 2 simply by first accepting p0 = AR* and then moving to the period 1 
efficient price Vector pl,Efficient (note: pl,Efficient , p • and (-~ ,-!!J__J are all Collinear in 
a1 a2 
the price plane, i.e., p 1,Efficien1 e E ). This it can do without detection by misrepresenting 
pl,Efficient as a period 1 profit-maximizing price vector. The resulting period 2 constraint 
will contain p • and so the firm will undermine the price cap. Specifically, if the firm 
reports marginal costs Ci and c2 satisfying: 
2a pl,Efficient + b - a C P2l,Efficient - p-· 
I I I I I =__..;;;; ___ _ 
2a P l,Efficient + b _ a C- I Efficient -• ' 2 2 2 2 2 Pi' - p 
(25) 
the price vector pl,Efficient will mimic a period 1 profit-maximizing price vector and the 
regulator may be oblivious to the presence of strategic behavior. 
When a firm reports marginal costs Ci and c2 differing from the actual marginal 
costs c1 and c2 , a fictitious profit-maximizing price vector p" = (j;;, p;) is implied 
whose components will satisfy the equation: 
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(26) 
h - P1 fff1 d - P2 Efq2 fi 1 th gul · · w ere 6 11 = -;:::;-- an 6 22 = -;:::---, ore se ere ator will not be convmced that 
qI opI q2 op2 
the firm is not sacrificing some period t profit for the purpose of pursuing an ulterior 
goal. Often information regarding elasticities, instead of demand function parameters per 
se, is all that is available to the regulator which is why we present the elasticity form of 
the equation. A reasonable assumption is that there is sufficient information, if only from 
the demand vectors at pr and p 0 , for the regulator to independently calculate the price 
elasticities 6 11 and 6 22 • If this is so, then the firm must ensure that &ii = 6 11 and 
&22 = 6 22 • Additionally, note that linear demands here imply Bq; = a; allowing us to 
BP; 
write the familiar form: 
(27) 
The regulator is now persuaded of an "ideal" iso-profit ellipse - in contrast to the 
"real" iso-profit ellipse - for tc = k of: 
(28) 
or 
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k+F 
(29) 
Figure 10 illustrates for a firm reporting c1 , and c2 that is also consistent with n{p r) = 0 . 
The ideal iso-profit ellipse is centered at: 
(30) 
and will be tangent to the period t constraint at the strategic period t price vector provided 
the firm reports marginal costs Ci and c2 satisfying (27). 
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Figure 10. Ideal and real iso-profit curves corresponding to strategic 
behavior in period t. 
r 
We see then that the regulator may recognize certain instances of when pl,Efficient 
is misrepresented as a period 1 profit-maximizing vector, if so doing forces the firm to 
report an unrealistic value for a fixed or marginal cost. Consider the following situations 
that assume the ideal situation of the regulator knowing all demand parameters: 
1. The ideal zero-profit iso-profit curve does not intersect the set of equal 
price vectors 11+. In this case the firm could not have earned non-negative 
profit at the price cap p 0 and should have protested. The ideal zero-profit 
iso-profit curve ( k = 0) should intersect 11+ at point(s) p' = (p', p') such 
that: 
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-, p = 
-(bl +b2 -al1 -a2c2)±~(b1 +b2 -alcl -a2cz)2 +4(al +a2Xb1C1 +b2C2 +F) 
2(a1 +ai) 
(31) 
Hence, if the firm reports marginal costs satisfying (26), but nevertheless 
F is so large that: 
(32) 
then the regulator may surmise that the firm willfully sacrificed profit at 
0 p. 
2. The price vector pr is outside of the zero-profit iso-profit ellipse 
( JZ"(p r) < 0 ). Such a configuration would be impossible if the firm were 
complying with a zero-profit regulatory scheme previous to the imposition 
of ARL. Hence, instead of Equation (28) the firm should attempt to 
satisfy: 
(28') 
where F is the reported fixed cost that must be revised downward 
( upward) from F in order to offset any increase (decrease) in the reported 
marginal costs, for else the regulator will not accept that pr was a pre-
ARL zero-profit price vector. Since the regulator will believe only F > 0, 
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it follows that there is a limit to how much the marginal costs can be over 
reported. 
3. The average revenue at pr is too small even though pr is located on the 
ideal zero-profit iso-profit (figure 11). Here the regulator knows that if the 
firm were truthfully reporting marginal and fixed costs in period I leading 
to the zero-profit iso-profit as pictured, it could not have earned non-
negative profit at the price cap because the cap is necessarily too low. The 
firm's assent to the price cap at p 0 is at least tacit acknowledgement that 
1r(p O ) ~ 0 , but if p0 < AR r in this type of configuration, then 1r(p O ) < 0 . 
The regulator is alerted to this occurrence because the firm reports 
marginal costs satisfying (26), but nevertheless has forced average revenue 
at pr to satisfy: 
<p' = 
-(b1 +b2 -al1 -a2c2 )+~(b1 +b2 -al1 -a2c2 )2 +4(a1 +a2 Xb1c1 +b2c2 +F) 
2(a1 +a2 ) 
(33) 
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ideal zero-profit 
iso-profit 11+ 
iso-surplus through P 
~ 
r 
Figure 11. Reported marginal costs force average revenue of pre-ARL 
regulation price vector and consequently initial price cap to be outside 
corresponding zero-profit iso-profit. 
It must be strongly emphasized, however, that absent the certainty that marginal 
costs are constant over all price vectors assumed by the firm, the regulator cannot appeal 
to any of the points listed above as indicators of strategic behavior. 
2.6. Strategic Behavior Under ARL Performed Over Multiple Periods (Linear 
Demands and Constant Marginal Costs) 
In contrast to the 2-period strategic behavior described previously, a firm may 
attempt a "go slow approach" by manipulating the ARL scheme over multiple periods, 
thus delaying its arrival at p • . Reasons for doing so might include an aversion by the 
firm to absorbing the necessary single-period sacrifice of forgone profits entailed in the 
shorter approach, or the fear that the required differential between reported and actual 
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marginal costs in the shorter approach would be so great as to raise the suspicions of the 
regulator. It should be obvious, however, that it becomes more difficult for the firm to 
misreport any parameter values in later and over multiple periods because the regulator 
gleans additional information about the firm as the process progresses. Consequently, the 
firm will do any strategic activity as early as possible. 
To demonstrate how the regulator could be alerted to strategic behavior 
performed over multiple periods, recall that a purported period t profit-maximizing price 
vector implies an ideal iso-profit center. Since under linear demands and constant 
marginal costs a family of iso-profits, whether real or ideal, must be concentric and of a 
common eccentricity and orientation, the myopic firm moves from one period to the next 
in such a way that the profit gradient is continually rotating toward that iso-profit center 
established in period I. The path taken by the "consistently" myopic firm under linear 
demands and constant marginal costs will be discussed in Proposition 2 of Chapter 3. 
2. 7. Strategic Behavior Under ARL Attaining p * as a Steady State in Period 2 
(Homogeneous Consumer Welfare Function) 
We explore now strategic behavior of the firm under ARL given a strictly-
convex homogeneous consumer welfare function. To illustrate, consider the 
homogeneous consumer surplus function V = kp1-a p 2 -P . Such a consumer surplus 
function would exist under a Cobb-Douglas utility function. The gradient of this function 
is VV = k(- ap1-a-I p 2 -P, - fJPi-a p 2 -P-I ). Now the slope of any line tangent to an iso-
surplus curve at the point (A, p 2 ) is given by m = - ap2 • Therefore, we can solve 
/JPi 
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* -* * P2 -p ap 
• _. = --+ for p* to obtain the average revenue for the global profit-maximum 
Pr - P j3p1 
price vector: 
(34) 
Now certainly, there is an interdependence between the consumer surplus function and 
the profit function which, depending on the parameter values in each, will constrain 
where p • may be located. Therefore, we are specifying only how the firm can achieve 
p * wherever it may be located. Necessarily then, the strategic price vector whose 
expression we now obtain must be stated in terms of p; and p;. 
If the firm accepts the price cap vector p O to be (J5* , p* ) , then it may achieve p * 
as a steady-state in period 2 of ARL regulation provided it can select any non-profit-
maximizing price vector in period 1. To see this, first note that the period 1 constraint is: 
(35) 
Using equation (34) we may write: 
(36) 
Now the strategic firm will seek a period 1 price vector pr,sirategic satisfying: 
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ap;,Strategic ap; 
= Rn11,Strategic R • n, JJP1 
(37) 
in order to achieve p • in period 2. Replacing p: with p 1,strategic in equation (36) and then 
substituting the resulting p; for p;,81rategic in equation (37) produces the following 
equation involving pl,Strategic : 
(a + fl )po _ ap:,Strategic p; 
--------= * . 
Pi flp:,Strategic 
(38) 
Solving equation (38) for p:,81rategic gives: 
P l,Strategic = (a + fl )p; po 1 • • 
apl + /Jp2 
(39) 
Substitution of the right side of (34) into (39) yields: 
Therefore we can obtain the period 1 strategic price vector from p; and p; simply by 
using equations (40) and (36). If the firm is permitted to price at this p 1·strategic in period 
1, it will successfully attain p • in period 2. Additionally, p • is a steady state since 
-0 -· p =p. 
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2. 7.1. An Example of Strategic Behavior Under ARL Attaining p * as a Steady 
State in Period 2 (Homogeneous Consumer Welfare Function) 
Suppose a firm under ARL regulation has a global profit maximum at 
p* = (4.00, 5.50). Also suppose consumer surplus is given by V = k(p1t(p 2 t 2 • Though 
indeed the consumer welfare and profit functions are dependant here, for appropriate 
marginal cost values this p * is certainly plausible. Average revenue at the global profit 
maximum is therefore by equation (34) p' = (! ( 2 Xj·0( ~.SO); = 4.888 8 . The period I 2 4.00 + 1 5.50 
which lies on this line has coordinates given by (40) and (36): 
and 
= (1+2)2(4.00)2(5.50) =39111 
(1(4.oo )+ 2(5.so )X2(4.oo )+ 1(5.50 )) · 
!,Strategic = (1 +!:_)((a+ fJ)p~ P; J-!:_pl,Strategic 
P2 fJ a • • fJ 1 JYPi + apz 
= (1 + !)((1 + 2X4.ooX5.so)) _!(3.911 T) = 5.3777. 
2 2(4.00)+ 1(5.50) 2 
Ob h h 1 f h • 1 hr h I Strategic t I Strategic • serve t at t e s ope o t e 1so-surp us t oug p ' a p ' 1s 
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ap}8trategic (1X5.3771) . . . 
m = - 181 1 . = - ( X ) = - 0.6875. Therefore, the penod 2 constramt 1s /JPi' raegtc 2 3.9111 
0.6875 p{ + p~ = 8.25. Finally, observe that p • = (4.00,5.50) satisfies this equation. 
Hence, we have demonstrated via an example how - for a homogeneous consumer 
surplus function - a price cap p0 satisfying p0 ~ p* can be undermined by the strategic 
firm. 
2.8. Summary of Chapter 2 
To summarize the main points of this chapter, a price cap set under ARL 
regulation may be subject to being undermined by the strategic firm if the level of the cap 
is greater than the average revenue of the global profit maximum. Currier (2005) has 
demonstrated this possibility for a consumer surplus function possessing a very 
reasonable desirability property. The content of this chapter demonstrates the possibility 
of like strategic behavior for the situation of linear product demands and constant 
marginal costs, and for the situation of a homogeneous consumer surplus function. While 
the regulator may be able to detect such behavior by using demand and cost function 
parameter values, in practice the likelihood of such information being accessible by the 
regulator is remote. Average-revenue-lagged regulation, its property of inducing firms to 
efficient prices notwithstanding, manifests deficiencies as a regulatory scheme designed 
for protecting consumer surplus. 
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3. MYOPIC BEHAVIOR UNDER AVERAGE-REVENUE-LAGGED 
REGULATION 
3.1. Convergence of the Myopic Firm Under Binding ARL to the Global Profit 
Maximum 
The objective of this chapter is to determine the conditions under which 
consistently myopic behavior under ARL given linear demands and constant marginal 
costs will inevitably lead to the profit-maximum price vector. 
Depending on the level of the price cap, it is possible that consistently myopic 
behavior can eventually lead the regulated firm to the global profit-maximum price 
vector. The following propositions address this possibility for linear demands and 
constant marginal costs. 
3.1.1. Proposition 2 
Suppose a firm with linear demands and constant marginal costs operates under 
ARL regulation with a price cap p0 satisfying p* ~ p0 • If the firm prices initially at 
(p*, p*) and is myopic over periods t = 1, 2, ... , then the sequence of price vectors {p1 } 
assumed by the firm lies along an ellipse centered at the price vector 
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Proof of Proposition 2: 
We assume that the myopic firm moves to a price vector pt in period t that is the 
point of tangency between the period t constraint line and the highest iso-profit possible. 
The constraint line is therefore binding. 
Equating the slope of the iso-profit through pt from (7) with the slope of the line 
segment through (p*, p*) and p 1 yields: 
-· t 
- p -p2 
-• I • p -Pi 
(41) 
Expanding about Pt and p~ gives: 
(42) 
yielding: 
(43) 
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which, upon completing the square in p: , and p~, leads to the equation: 
(44) 
This produces the standard form for an ellipse: 
(45) 
1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 lie on the ellipse can be shown by ( ac -b +ac -b ac -b +ac -b J 2(a1 + a2 ) ' 2(a1 + a2 ) 
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substitution of the coordinates for each of these price vectors into (41) (See Appendix B 
for how the coordinates of (_p*, p*) are defined in terms of the demand and cost function 
parameters). 
* 
setE of 
~+ 
( treated as the 
price cap by the 
firm) 
Figure 12. Elliptical path of the consistently myopic firm where the 
price cap is set at the average revenue of the global profit maximum. 
3.1.2. Proposition 3 
The sequence of price vectors {pt,Myopic} (profit-maximizing price vectors) for 
periods t = 1, 2, ... , not only exists along the elliptical path of Proposition 2, but for a 
price cap set at p 0 = p* will converge over time to the global profit-maximum price 
vector p •. Moreover, p • is a steady state. 
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Proof of Proposition 3: 
Without loss of generality assume p • is above the line 1.1+ and p 0 = p*. Also, 
assume p • is not attainable in period t under ARL regulation (figure 13). Assume 
linear demands and constant marginal costs. 
Let pt,Myopic be the point on the period t constraint line at which period t profit is 
a maximum. Then at p 1,Myopic the slope of the iso-profit must be greater than the slope of 
the iso-surplus curve. This follows because at the period t efficient price vector p',Efficient 
8tr 
we have - 8Pi 
8tr = 
av 
8PJ 
av 
8p2 pt,EjJicient 
and to traverse the period t constraint from 
p',Efficient to p 1,Myopic we must increase Pi and decrease p 2 • This implies decreasing Btr 
apl 
with increasing Btr because tr is C 2 and strictly concave. Also, we have increasing 
8p2 
av with decreasing av because V is C 2 and strictly convex. This leads to the 
8p1 8p2 
8tr 
. 1· 8PJ 
mequa 1ty - Btr 
8tr 
8p1 
m =---
, 8tr 
. Now the slope of the period t constraint is 
ap2 pt,Myoopic 
because the iso-profit through pt,Myopic is tangent to the period t 
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av 
constraint. Also, the slope of the period t + 1 constraint is mt+1 = - : by 
definition of the ARL process (provided pt,Myopic is assumed by the firm in period t). 
Hence mt+1 < mt and there is clockwise rotation about p 0 from the period t constraint to 
the period t + 1 constraint. The sequence of price vectors {pt,Myopic} moves rightward and 
upward from pt,Myopic along the elliptical path of Proposition 2. Moreover, for any period 
av 
. -· p -p aPi 
f + 1 We must have : -* < mt+I because mt+I = - av Pi -p 
* -· 
av 
ap, 
>---
av 
8p2 pt,Ejjicient 
= 
_ P2 - P { } 
• _. . Hence, m1 is a monotone decreasing sequence bounded from 
P1 -p 
below. 
• -* 
h · A h h A P2 - p A Now suppose t ere exists m sue t at m1 > m > • _. where m is a lower Pi -p 
bound for the sequence {mt } . Then there is a price vector p * p * satisfying 
av a1r 
aPi aPi 
~---
av a1r = m ,for otherwise m could not be a lower bound. But this 
ap2 . p ap2 . p 
contradicts the implication of Proposition 2 that there is only one price vector on the 
elliptical path of the consistently myopic firm for the case p 0 = p*, namely p*, where 
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av a:r 
a a • -· 
- fv1 ~ - ; 1 ~ P; - ~. . Therefore, 
u :!.!!_ Pi - p 
. -· P2 -p 
• _. is the greatest lower bound and the 
Pi -p 
8p2 8p2 
. -· 
sequence {mt} converges to p; - ~ .. 
P1 -p 
So if the price cap p 0 is set at p*, then the consistently myopic firm converges 
over time to the global profit-maximum price vector p • (figure 13). Observe 
. -· P2 -p 
• _. guarantees that p * will be a steady state. 
P1 -p 
* p 
set E of efficient 
~+ 
pt, Efficient 
period t constraint 
period t + 1 constraint 
Figure 13. Consistently myopic firm moves along elliptical path towards the 
global profit maximum. 
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3.1.3. An Example of Consistently Myopic Behavior Under ARL Regulation 
Approaching p * as a Steady State (Linear Demands and Constant Marginal 
Costs) 
To illustrate a case of inevitable convergence of the consistently myopic firm 
under ARL regulation to p • as a steady state (linear demands and constant marginal 
costs), consider the monopolist examined earlier. Recall that the product demand 
functions were q1 = -5 p1 + 20 and q2 = -6 p 2 + 40, while the cost function was 
C = q1 + 3q2 + 16.1369. The global profit-maximum price vector of 
p • = (2.5000,4.833 3) can be attained as a steady state via strategic behavior within just 
two periods of regulation given that the firm can accept the price cap to be J5° = 
3.887387 (a little more precision here for purposes of our illustration). Now note that the 
consistently myopic firm will in each period t attempt to solve equations (17) - (19). 
Doing so produces the following expressions for the period t myopic price vector given 
the linear demand functions q; = a;P; + h; where i = 1, 2, ... , n and cost function 
1 { 1-1-0 1 [ 1-1 ] } 1 
- qi p -- 9.J:.._ b -a C -b +a C + -o P1 - t-1 t-1 t-1 2 t-1 ( I I I) 2 2 2 p 
<JJ__+5-9..L q2 a2 q1 
t-1 t-1 
q2 a2 q1 
4 Obtained by use of the computer algebra system Derive. 
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4 t = 1, 2, .... (46) 
Appendix D gives alternative recursion formulas for pt,Myopic in terms of pt-I,Myopic. 
Of course we have p~ = p0 and q~ = a;p~ + h;. Several iterations of this 
procedure were performed for identical demand and cost function parameter values as 
before to produce Table 1. Each row of the table represents one period of the ARL 
process. Perhaps surprisingly, this firm also converges to p • = (2.5000,4.833 3) as a 
steady state, although the convergence is not as rapid as that corresponding to the 
strategic behavior described earlier. 
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Consistently myopic behavior (demands q1 = -5p1 + 20 and q2 = -6p2 + 40, cost 
function C = % + 3q2 + 16.1369, and price cap p0 = 3.887387 = p*) 
Period Prices Quantities Consumer Sequence of 
Demanded Surplus and Projections of 
Firm Profit Proposition 4 
Initial Price P? = 3.887387 q? = 0.563063 v(p O ) = 23 .204891 
Vector pi = 3.887387 qg = 16.67568 1r(p0 )= 0.286666 
Period 1 Pi = 2.463619 q; = 7.681903 v(p1 ) = 28.27961 U1 = -3.753987 
p~ = 3.935462 q~ = 16.38723 1r(p1 )= 10.43611 
Period 2 p; = 2.468426 q; = 8.157868 v(p2 )= 19.4754 U2 = -1.86983 
p; = 4.599436 qi = 12.40338 1r(p2 ) = 14.86496 
Period 3 Pi = 2.482625 qf = 7.586877 v(p3 )= 16.08302 U3 = -1.1117 
p~ =4.811318 q~ = 11.13209 1r(p3 )= 15.27535 
Period 4 p: = 2.499792 q: = 7.501042 v(p4 )= 15.7127 U4 = -1.023012 
P1 = 4.833079 q1 = 11.00153 1r(p4 )= 15.27977 
Period 5 Pi = 2.500000 qi = 7.500000 v(p5J= 15.70833 U5 = -1.021957 
p~ = 4.833333 q; = 11.00000 1r(p5 )= 15.27977 
Period 6 Pt = 2.500000 q: = 7.500000 v(p6 J= 15.70833 u6 =-1.021957 
p; = 4.833333 q; = 11.00000 1r(p6 )= 15.27977 
Table 1 
Hence, even the consistently myopic firm can undermine any price cap p0 ~ p0 
given linear demands and constant marginal costs provided it may effectively treat p* as 
its price cap. This would seem to present a severe indictment against binding ARL. 
Observe that Cowan's (1997) assertion regarding changes in consumer surplus is 
demonstrated once again since taking the steady-state price vector ps to be p 6 gives 
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V(ps )= 15.70833 < v{p 0 )= 23.204891 < V(p1 )= 28.27961. Cowan also states, 
"Steady-state prices when the firm is myopic satisfy the necessary condition for 
efficiency. Profits are higher, consumer surplus is lower, and welfare is higher than with 
equal prices." This proposition is born out by the results in Table 1. The steady-state 
price vector ps = (2.50000,4.83333) belongs to the set of efficient prices. Also, 
1r(ps)=15.27977 > 1r(p0 )=0.286666, v(ps)=15.70833 < v{p 0 )=23.204891,and 
w(ps )= 30.9881 > 23.491557 = w(p0 ). 
Nevertheless, note there is one redeeming note regarding the ability of the 
regulator to detect when the strategic firm is seeking to quickly arrive at the global profit-
maximum price vector. Any period t price vector p 1 which would be required for the 
firm to attain in order to ultimately achieve p • in a finite number of periods later will 
force the firm to move outside of the path traced by the consistently myopic firm. 
Marginal cost values implied after the reporting of profit by the firm at the price vector 
p 1 , even if selected under bogus reporting, set the firm on a particular course from which 
it cannot stray. The regulator needs only substitute these marginal cost values into ( 42). 
The firm is expected to converge to the ideal iso-profit center 
'jj* = (- (b1 -al'1) ,- (b2 -a2ci}J established in period 1 instead of the global profit 
2a1 2a2 
maximum p • it surely desires. Any deviation from this path is easily detectable. 
The inability of the firm to perform strategic behavior over multiple periods 
notwithstanding, ARL regulation is a very limited approach for the regulator to use in the 
effort of securing a satisfactory level of consumer surplus. With no constraints on 
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marginal or fixed costs beyond the standard ones attending application of the profit 
function to the price vectors pr and p 0 , the firm under ARL regulation can succeed in 
undermining the price cap and achieving the global profit maximum within the first two 
periods of regulation. 
3.2. Social Welfare Movement Under ARL and Policy Recommendations 
Summing the right-hand sides of equations (1) and (5) gives the following for the 
social welfare function: 
(47) 
!so-welfare curves are therefore of the form: 
Ln [a. 2 2a.b.c. + b.2 ] W=-F+ -'p. -a.c.p.- ''' ' 2 I I I I 2 i=I a; (48) 
or 
~ a. (p )2 1b. +a.c)2 W=-F+LJ-' .-c. -~' I I 
i=] 2 I I 2aj (49) 
For n = 2, ( 49) becomes: 
(50) 
which is an ellipse in the price plane centered at the social welfare optimum price vector 
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(c1, c2 ) (marginal cost pricing). Substituting 1r(p1 )+ v(p1 ) for W in (50) allows us to 
determine what, if any, price vectors are Pareto superior to p' . For example, in the case 
examined previously where product demand functions are q1 = -5 A + 20 and 
q2 = -6p2 + 40, while the cost function is C = q1 + 3q2 + 16.1369, we obtain the 
following locus of price vectors that are Pareto equivalent to 
pI,Myopic = {2.463619, 3.935462): 
v(pI,Myopic )+ 1r(pI,Myopic )+ F 
(51) 
which yields 54.85262 = - ~ A 2 + 5 A - 3 p 2 2 + 18 p 2 + 1 OO . A plot of this ellipse along 2 3 
with the period 1 and 2 constraint lines and the vector p 1,Myopic are pictured in figure 14. 
Price vectors in the interior of this ellipse are Pareto superior to p 1,Myopic • 
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\ 
period 2 constraint 
~+ 
period 1 constraint 
pl,Myopic 
ellipse interior: 
. p . pl,Myopic pnce vectors areto supenor to 
Figure 14. Period 2 price vectors in example are Pareto inferior to pl,Myopic. 
In this example we see that there is no price vector on the period 2 constraint that 
is Pareto superior or equivalent to pl,Myopic. Moreover, an examination of the social 
welfare values in Table 1 indicates that social welfare accompanying myopic behavior 
may decrease continually over time beginning in period 1. This is not necessarily always 
the case and Cowan (1997) notes only that consumer surplus is higher in period 1 than at 
the price cap vector, but is lower in the steady state. Nevertheless, as this example 
illustrates, welfare can move in the wrong direction, which possibility justifies some 
precaution against it. Accordingly, note that if upon moving to any price vector on the 
period 2 constraint the firm were required to fully compensate the consumer for the 
consumer surplus lost in moving from pl,Myopic, the firm would prefer to remain at 
pl,Myopic. The author therefore suggests a modification to the ARL process that would 
inure to the benefit of society generally and to the consumer particularly. 
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3.2.1. Policy Recommendation 1 (Applicable to Binding ARL Regulation of Two-
Product-Market Firms Where Product Demand Functions Are Linear) 
The regulator should observe product demand vectors q0 = (q~ ,q~) and 
q 1 = (qf ,qn corresponding to the price vectors p0 = (p 0 ,p0 ) and p 1 = (pf ,p;) assumed 
by the firm initially and in period 1, respectively. Estimates of the demand parameters a1 , 
a 2 , b1 , and b2 can be determined by the regulator from solving the linear systems 
should estimate consumer surplus at p 1 according to the formula 
1 a. 1 b. 2 ( J2 v(p ) = ~-1 p; + a: . The firm should then be permitted to select any period 2 
price vector p 2 on the period 2 constraint line only if it agrees to compensate the 
regulatory board by the amount v(p1 )- v(p2 ) where v(p') = t- a; (P: + !!.i_J 2 
,;1 2 a; 
Otherwise, the firm is permitted only to select a period 2 price vector that lies on the 
period I constraint line. In all likelihood, any necessary compensation would take the 
form of a customer rebate program. Regulators often do require firms to do this. 
Implementation of this policy recommendation will not only ensure that welfare is 
non-decreasing from period I to period 2, but can offset the decrease in consumer surplus 
accompanying ARL regulation if compensations from the firm to the regulatory board are 
forwarded as rebates to the consumer. Further, this requirement can induce the firm away 
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from any non-profit-maximizing strategic price vector as outlined in Proposition 1 during 
period 1 because such non-optimal pricing will only increase the differential 
v(p1 )-v(p2 ). Observe from Table 1 that the consistently myopic firm positioned at 
pl,Myopic = (2.463619, 3.935462) Will not elect to proceed to p 2'Myopic = (2.368426, 
Jr p2,Myopic _ Jr PI,Myopic 
4.599436) since I M . 2 M . V p , yoptc _ V p , yop,c = 14.86496-10.43611 = 0.50304 < 1.00. 28.27961-19.4754 
3.2.2. Policy Recommendation 2 (Applicable to Binding ARL Regulation of Two 
Product-Market Firms Where Product Demand Functions Are Linear) 
An alternative recommendation offered here draws upon a procedure constructed 
by Tam (1981) which has been demonstrated to lead a myopic firm in a Barone-Lange 
socialist economy to efficient prices. Tam's scheme, as modified by Finsinger and 
Vogelsang (1985) to disallow certain possible strategic behavior, induces a firm to 
efficient prices by rewarding the firm according to price improvements as it maximizes 
profit in each time period. In the case of a firm desirous of raising its prices, a tax of 
(p 1 - pt-I)· qt-I in each period is assessed against the firm. The firm therefore will not 
raise its prices from period t - 1 to period t unless the increased profit exceeds this 
measure of reduction in price performance. Essentially this scheme encourages profit-
maximizing behavior by the firm through penalizing it for setting high prices. Observe 
from Table 1 that under such a system our consistently myopic firm positioned at 
pl,Myopic = (2.463619, 3.935462) Will not elect to proceed to p 2'Myopic = (2.368426, 
4.599436) because the tax (pt - pt-I)· qt-I = (2.368426-2.463619)(7.681903) + 
(4.599436- 3.935462)(16.38723) = 10.14943 is greater than the additional profit to the 
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firm of 14.86496 - 10.43611 = 4.42885. However, there may be a period t price vector 
beneath the period t constraint the firm would desire to move to if the additional profit for 
doing so exceeds the corresponding tax. 
The Lagrangian for this problem is: 
and Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions for a solution are: 
V 1r(p1 )- q(pt-1) = ,t q(pt-1 ) 
,it l(Po _pt)· q(pt-1 )j = O 
}.,1 ~ 0. 
(53) 
(54) 
(55) 
For .t > 0, we have binding ARL and the firm will move to the period t myopic price 
vector pt,Myopic guaranteed by Proposition 2. For ,1,1 = 0, ARL is nonbinding and the firm 
may select a period t price vector beneath the period t constraint line. In fact, the firm 
converges to the global social-welfare maximum (ci,c2 ) provided the tax applied to the 
firm that chooses to lower its profit and increase social welfare from period t - 1 to t can 
be negative, i.e., a subsidy is paid to the firm. In this case, Tam's scheme essentially 
overrides ARL regulation. To demonstrate that this convergence to (ci,cz) will occur, 
note that for }.,1 = 0 equation (53) becomes: 
(56) 
which, for the profit function given by (5) corresponding to the linear case, yields: 
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(57) 
Consequently, we obtain the recursive formula: 
1-1 
, P· +c. 
P; = I 2 I (58) 
Hence, the firm in period twill move to the vector of prices p 1 , where each p: is the 
simple average of the preceding period's price p:-1 and the marginal cost of production 
c; for market i. The subsidy (negative tax) provided to the firm must increase in each 
period thy: 
!ls' = -(pt _ pt-1 )· qt-1 = i: (p:-1 _pt) q:-1 
i=l 
(59) 
where !ls' = s' - s'-1 and s 1 = 0 . 
3.3. Behavior of the Myopic Price Vector Sequence Within ARL About Steady States 
and Multiple Steady States 
Let p 1 be the price vector assumed by the firm under binding ARL in period t. 
Also let p,,vmin be the price vector at which consumer surplus is minimized over the 
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period t constraint, i.e., vv(pt,Vmin )· (pt,Vmin - p 0 )= 0. Now the strict convexity of the 
consumer surplus function tells us that the slope of the iso-surplus through p' exceeds 
the slope of the period t constraint when both p' and p,,vmin are below the set 11+ if and 
only if p' is a greater distance from p 0 than is p,,vmin. Alternatively, the slope of the 
iso-surplus through p' is less than the slope of the period t constraint when both p' and 
p,,vmin are above the set 11+ if and only if p' is a greater distance from p 0 than is 
p,,vmin. Since ARL stipulates that the period t + 1 constraint be parallel to the iso-surplus 
through p' at p', the ARL constraint line rotates from period t to period t + 1 in a 
predictable way depending on the positions of p 1 and p 0 relative to p 1'vmin. Considering 
p' and p,,vmin above the set 11+, the constraint line will rotate clockwise about p 0 from 
period t to period t + 1 if ~(p: - p0 )2 + (p~ - p0 )2 > ~(p:,vmin _ po )2 + (p~,Vmin _ po )2 , 
and will rotate counterclockwise if ~(p: - p0 )2 + (p~ - p0 )2 < 
~(p:,vmin - p0 )2 + (p~,vmin - p0 )2 . Similarly, for p 1 and p,,vmin below the set 11+, the 
constraint line will rotate clockwise about p 0 from period t to period t + 1 if 
counterclockwise if ~(p: - p0 )2 + (p~ - p0 )2 > ~(p:,vmin - p0 ) 2 + (p~,Vmin _ po )2 . 
In general, we may say that for any price vector p 1+1 satisfying the period t + 1 
( I O) 0 
constraint we havep - p · p 
' ~(p: _ Po )2 + (p~ _ po )2 
(p1+1 _po)· po 
< - - if and only 
~(p:+1 _ po )2 + (p~+l _ Po )2 
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if ~(p: - p0 )2 + (p~ - p 0 )2 > ~(p:,Vmin - p0 )2 + (p~,vmin - p 0 )2 . We are using the fact 
that the angle (} between two vectors u = p 0 and v = p 1 - p 0 is obtainable by the well-
known formula u · v = iullvl cos 8 where iul and lvl are the Euclidean lengths of u and v, 
( I O) 0 
respectively. Hence, the expressionp - p · p is in absolute value equal 
'( t -0 )2 ( t -0 )2 V Pi -p + P2 -p 
to the length of the projection of p 0 onto the period t constraint vector p 1 - p 0. The 
following proposition guarantees the existence of a steady-state efficient price vector 
within a certain set of prices given binding ARL regulation with a C 2 strictly convex 
consumer surplus function and a C 2 strictly concave profit function. Neither linear 
demands nor constant marginal costs need be assumed. 
3.3.1. Proposition 4 
Define the sequence 
U = (pt,Myopic _po). po 
1 
~&:,Myopic _ po )2 + (p~,A,zyopic _ po )2 (60) 
where pt,Myopic is the price vector assumed by the myopic firm in period t under binding 
ARL with C 2 convex consumer surplus function and C 2 concave profit function. If for 
some t we have u, < ut+1 and u1+2 < u1+1 , then there exists a steady-state efficient price 
( S O) 0 
vector p 8 satisfying u, < ~p - p -· p 
{ __ s -0)2 ( s -0)2 \PI - p + P2 -p < u1+1 • The scalar u1 is the 
magnitude of the projection of the price-cap vector p 0 onto p 1 - p 0 (u, < 0 simply 
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indicates that the angle between p 0 and the vector p 1 - p 0 is greater than 90°). See 
figure 15. 
s 
P somewhere 
pt+l here Ii+ 
0 
price cap vector P 
repositioned to show 
how projections 
period t + 1 constraint 
are formed 
right angle at the tip of 
the projection vector 
period t constraint 
period t + 2 constraint 
Figure 15. When u, < u,+i and u,+2 < u1+1 a steady-state price vector p 8 must 
exist somewhere between the period t and period t + 1 constraints. (For the 
figure here we have u, < 0 and u1+2 < 0 , but u1+1 > 0 ). 
Proof of Proposition 4: 
For every uMyopic e [u,, ut+1 ] there exists a unique price vector pMyopic such that 
( Myopic O) 0 
UMyopic =p - P · P and V 1r(pMyopic )· (pMyopic _po)= O. This 
~ (Pt1yopic _ po )2 + (p;tyopic _ po } 
follows because 1r is C 2 and strictly concave. Also, for every uvmin e [u,,u,+1 ] there 
exists a unique price vector pvmin 
( Vmin O) 0 
such that uvmin =p - p· p 
~(Pimin _po} + (p~min _po} 
and 
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vv(pvmin )· (PVmin - p 0 )= 0. This follows because V is C 2 and strictly convex. Define 
the functions J(uMyopic )= ~(P~pic - Po )2 + (p~opic - Po )2 and 
{ Vmin) ~( Vmin -0 )2 ( Vmin -0 )2 N th ARL · }" th · g\u = Pi - p + p 2 - p . ow e process imp 1es at smce 
u, < u,+1 we have f(u,) > g(u, ), and since u1+2 < u,+i we have J(u,+1) < g(ut+1 ). So since 
,r and V are both continuous, then by the Intermediate Value Theorem there exists 
Us e {u"u,+i) such that f(us) = g(us ). But this implies there is a price vector ps such 
An important use of Proposition 4 is to alert the regulator when the consistently 
myopic firm is converging to a steady-state price vector. In Table 1 we see that the 
sequence of projections {u1 } is monotone because the price cap is set at the average 
revenue of the profit maximum. In a vacuous sense, the sequence obeys Proposition 4 as 
its movement never reverses direction. 
Now we must acknowledge the possibility that in the general case multiple steady 
states can correspond to the price cap. However, if the sequence {u,} reverses direction, 
the steady state guaranteed by Proposition 4 cannot be p • because the constraint never 
needs to bind. Oscillation in the sequence {u,} signifies convergence to a steady state 
other than p • . 
For the instance of where the period t constraint line is positioned between two 
steady states corresponding to the price cap p 0 , the direction of rotation to the period 
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t + 1 constraint is determined by the positions of p 1 and p 0 relative to pi,vmin. If two 
steady-state price vectors p 0 and pb are related to the period t constraint as in figure 16, 
then the constraint line rotates towards pb in period t + 1. When the path of pt,Myopic is 
outside the path of pt,Vmin (i.e., pt,Myopic is a greater distance from 11+ than is pi,vmin ), 
the constraint line rotates away from the origin and the sequence {u1 } is increasing. 
Alternatively, when the path of pt,Myopic is inside the path of pi,vmin, the constraint line 
rotates toward the origin and the sequence {u1 } is decreasing. 
P2 
t 
{p I V 1r(p). (p - p O) = 0} 
\ Pb 
p 0 
Ii+ / 
{p I VV(p)·(p- p0 )= o} 
a b 0 
P and P are steady-state efficient price vectors for P 
P1 
Figure 16. Period t constraint line between two steady states. 
3.4. Firm Behavior Under ARL in the Face of a Positive Discount Factor 
Cowan (1997) states that for a strictly positive discount factor steady-state prices 
will be inefficient. A positive discount factor is due to the.fact that because of uncertainty 
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a firm values the prospect of obtaining a specific sum in the future less than it values 
possessing the identical sum in the present. The relevant infinite-horizon Lagrangian is: 
+ Pln-(p2 )+ ;i2(po _ P2 )· q(p1 )J 
+ (p)2[n-(p3)+;i3(po -p3)·q(p2)] + ... 
= f (py-1 [n-(p' )+ ;i' (po _ p' )· q(pt-1 )] (61) 
,~1 
where p is the discount factor and ;L' is the Lagrange multiplier in period t. The first-
order conditions for prices yield: 
(62) 
The extra term on the right hand side of (62) is due to the influence of the slope of the 
iso-surplus through p' at p' on the slope of the period t + 1 constraint. Steady-state 
prices satisfy: 
(63) 
Cowan notes that because of the term pm(p 8 Xp 0 - p8 ) on the right-hand side of (63) 
the necessary condition of efficient prices for a steady-state price vector no longer 
applies. For demand functions q; = a;P; + b; the profit gradient is: 
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Therefore at the steady-state price vector for p 0 satisfying p 0 ::;; p* we have: 
(65) 
for all i. Solving for ;i yields: 
(66) 
For n = 2, steady-state price vectors corresponding to the positive discount factor p will 
necessarily satisfy: 
2a1pf + b1 - a1C1 - 2a2Pi + b2 - a2C2 
a1 (1 + P )pf + b1 - /Ja1P0 - ai{l + P )pf + b2 - /Ja2P0 (67) 
which defines Pi as a linear function of pf. Note that 
therefore be obtained by solving the system comprised of this equation and: 
(ps - po)· VV(ps )= 0. (68) 
To illustrate, consider the previously considered demand and cost functions 
q1 = -5Pi + 20, q2 = -6p2 +40, and C = q1 +3q2 + 16.1369. Also let the price cap be 
p 0 = p" = 3.8874. The locus for (67) becomes 
-lOpf +25 -12pi +58 S p o 95 Th ( ) = ( ) . uppose = . . e 
-51 + p pf+ 20+ 19.437 p -6 l+ p Pi+ 40+ 23.3244ft 
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locus for (67) now becomes 56.0818pf -169.0818pf = -677.0242. The price vector 
(pi,p2 ) = (5.362666, 5.782835) is on this line and satisfies (68). However, this vector is 
not actually in the domain of the functions v(p) and 1r(p) (Recall that the domain of 
both functions is {(p1, p 2 ) I O ::;; P; ::;; -b; I a; , i = 1, 2} which here becomes 
{(p1, p 2 ) I O ::;; Pt ::;; 4, 0 ::;; p 2 ::;; 20 I 3} ). Hence, p • is really the only meaningful steady-
state price vector here. Cowan's assertion actually does not apply in this context. 
Proposition 5 gives conditions under which p • will be the steady state in the face of a 
positive discount factor given linear demands and constant marginal costs. 
3.4.1. Proposition 5 
For positive discount factor p, linear demand functions, constant marginal costs 
c1 and c2, and a price cap p 0 whose level satisfies p0 = p*, p0 > c1 and p 0 > c2, 
there are no steady states in the domains of v(p) and 1r(p) other than at p • . 
Proof of Proposition 5: 
Solve (67) for pf to obtain: 
p _ a1Pt (2f3a2P 0 + P(b2 - a2C2 )- a2C2 - b2 )+ 1¥5° (a2b1 - a1 (a2 (c1 - ci) + b2 )) 
P2 - a2 (2 f3a1Po + p(b1 - a1 C1 )- a1 C1 - bi} 
+ a1b2c1 -a2b1c2 s 
• l 
5 Obtained by use of the computer algebra system Derive. 
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(69) 
Letting f3 = 0 in (69) produces: 
(70) 
which, as we should expect, is equation (12) again defining the set of efficient prices. 
Also, letting f3 = 1.0 in (69) yields: 
A plot of ( 68) with (70) and (71) in the price plane is provided in figure 17. Observe that 
for all values of f3 satisfying O < f3 ~ 1.00 the intersection of ( 68) and ( 69) is properly 
outside the domain set {(Pi, p 2 ) I O ~ P; ~ -b; I a; , i = 1, 2} except for the price vector 
p • .Confirmation of this result is obtained by substituting Pi = _'!i in the right-hand 
a1 
side of (70) thus yielding pf = -~, and by noting that since p0 > c1 and p 0 > c2 , the 
a2 
slope of the line represented by (71) which is: 
po-c 
m= 2 
-0 p -CI 
(72) 
must be positive, and hence cannot intersect the ellipse of (68) in the aforementioned 
domain. 
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eq. (70) 
* p 
eq. (71) 
direction of 
increasing P 
P 8 for P = 1.0 
~ 
: domain for v(p) and 1t{p) 
Figure 17. Locus of possible steady-state price vectors corresponding to a 
positive discount factor p (p 0 = p*, p 0 > c; for i = 1, 2). 
We have here a particular story not presented by Cowan regarding steady states 
attained by a firm when discounting future profits. Specifically, for linear demands, 
constant marginal costs, and price cap p 0 satisfying p 0 = p*, p 0 > c; for both i = 1, 2, 
where C; is the marginal cost of production for market i, if the firm seeks to maximize 
the present value of a future stream of profits, the resulting steady state is the price vector 
p • which indeed is efficient. 
However, Cowan does demonstrate by example that if p 0 is less than c; for some 
i, there can be a feasible inefficient steady state that will manifest a perversity of 
producing a welfare level below that obtained with no regulation, i.e., w(ps) < w(p ·). 
The question of what precise circumstances (given linear demands and constant marginal 
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costs) lead to this outcome for welfare is addressed by the statement of Proposition 6. 
· 3.4.2. Proposition 6 
Given linear demand functions q; = a;P; + b;, constant marginal costs Ci and c2 , 
and a price cap p 0 whose level satisfies p0 < c; for exactly one i, if 
a (4(a )2 I =0 V. - (b )2 }+ 3a (b )2 3a (c )2 + 6b c + 3a (c )2 - 2(4a p-0 + b \_ + i 2 \P J 2 2 i < O i i i i 2 2 2 2 F2 , 
aia2 
then there exists a critical value /Jc for the discount factor satisfying O < pc < 1.0 such 
that for any /Js where /Jc < /Js < 1.0 there exists a non-efficient steady-state price 
vector ps in the domains of v(p) and :r(p) satisfying w(ps) < w(p • ). 
Proof of Proposition 6: 
Without loss of generality, assume c2 > Ci • Consider the system of equations 
formed by: 
(73) 
(74) 
(75) 
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in variables Pi, p 2 , and P . Equation (73) is the iso-welfare curve through p* (cp. 
equation 50) obtained by employing (10) and (11). Equation (74) is the set of steady-state 
price vectors for p 0 under ARL regulation, i.e., (p - p 0 )· vv(p )= 0. Equation (75) 
follows from the first-order conditions on the Lagrangian (cp. equation 67). Now it can 
be shown by direct substitution in (74) that (p0 ,-!!J:...J, (-!l,p0 J, and (-!l,_!!J:...J 
a2 a1 a1 a2 
are on the ellipse of steady-state price vectors associated with p 0 • Additionally, for 
p = 0 we have the first-order condition line (75) giving the equation of the set E of 
efficient prices which is the positively sloped line passing through (ci,c2 ), p*, and 
(-!!1_,_!!J,___J. For p = 1.0 we have (75) producing the first-order condition line (71). If 
a1 a2 
p0 < c; for exactly one i, then by (72) m < 0 and the line of (75) is sloped downward. 
Note: if p0 < c; for both i = 1, 2, then .1r(p •) < 0 results thus putting the firm out of 
business. Hence we do not consider this possibility. A graph of this system for 
c2 < p0 < c1 and _ !!1_ > _!!J,_ is represented in figure 18. 
a1 a2 
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first-order 
condition 
line for 
/3 = 1.0 
11+ 
set E of efficient 
steady states 
0 
under P 
first-order 
condition 
line for 
/3 = 0.0 
iso-welfare 
• 
through P 
Figure 18. !so-welfare through p 0 , steady states for p 0 , first-order 
condition lines, and pc for discount factor f3. 
Observe the price vector pc = (pf ,Pi.) at the intersection of the iso-welfare 
curve (73) and the set of steady states (74). For particular c1 and c2 satisfying c2 > c1 , 
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P1 
this vector could exist to the right of (- !: , p') and thus outside the domain of n:(p) 
and v(p). To obtain the situation of figure 19 we simply require that cI and c2 force 
w(i,' ) > w(- !: , p') . The price vector (- !: , p') is then outside the iso-welfare curve 
passing through p • . Hence, we use ( 51) to produce the additional necessary condition 
that cI and c2 satisfy: 
3(aicI + bi}2 3(a2c2 + b2 )2 
8aI 8a2 
to establish the existence of such a pc . Expanding (76) about cI and c2 yields: 
a (4(a )2 { =0 \l- - (b )2 )+ 3a (b )2 3a (c )2 + 6b c + 3a (c )2 - 2(4a p-0 + b \_ + I 2 \P I 2 2 I < O I I I I 2 2 2 2 F2 
aia2 
(77) 
for the feasible set of marginal costs in the cI,c2 dual space. Ordered pairs (cI,c2) for 
which pc, as pictured in figure 19, exist are points in the interior of the elliptical-curve 
graph in ci,c2 space of the equation corresponding to (77). 
Now for any ps where pc < ps < 1.0 we see there is a non-efficient steady-
state price vector ps in the domains of v(p) and 1r(p) satisfying W(ps )< W(p*) 
because ps is outside the iso-welfare ellipse through p •. See figure 19. 
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vectors for P 
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Figure 19. Rotation of first-order condition line with increasing p. 
As a final caveat, however, note that even under nonlinear demands and non-
constant marginal costs a firm cannot be successful in convincing the regulator that a 
steady-state price vector corresponding to a positive discount factor p , or for that matter 
any price vector other than p ·, is an efficient price vector indefinitely. Though a firm 
may reasonably be expected to misjudge the precise location of pt.Myopic in any period t, 
the firm will not be able to pass off the steady state pp for p • indefinitely because the 
observed product demand vector q(pP) will not be orthogonal to p 0 - pp. 
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3.5. Summary of Chapter 3 
In summary, this chapter has investigated myopic behavior of the ARL regulated 
firm. If product demands are linear and marginal costs are constant, even the consistently 
myopic firm will inevitably arrive at the global profit maximum. Moreover, this 
convergence may be fairly rapid as demonstrated with our example. This deficiency of 
ARL exists again when the level of the price cap exceeds the average revenue of the 
profit maximum. Policy recommendations are herein offered to offset this failing, yet 
each has its limitations and is not so automatic in implementation. Additionally, as 
multiple steady states associated with the cap is a real possibility, this chapter suggests a 
method by which the regulator should be able to detect whether or not the steady state 
approached by the firm is in fact the profit maximum. Also, we have complemented 
Cowan' s finding that under binding ARL with a positive discount factor steady-state 
prices that are not equal are inefficient, by showing that when the price cap level is set 
above all marginal costs of production the firm will nevertheless approach the global 
profit-maximum which is indeed an efficient price vector. Finally, to expand on Cowan's 
example demonstrating that steady-state welfare under ARL can be below that associated 
with no regulation, we have provided more specific conditions under which this situation 
can occur. 
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4. STRATEGIC AND MYOPIC BEHAVIOR UNDER LASPEYRES 
PRICE CAP REGULATION 
4.1. Movement of Profit, Consumer Surplus, and Social Welfare Under Laspeyres 
Price Cap Regulation 
The objective of this chapter is to determine necessary and sufficient conditions 
under which Laspeyres price cap regulation will not be susceptible to manipulation by the 
regulated firm. 
There are some general reasons for preferring Laspeyres price cap regulation to 
ARL. The firm can change prices in each period to maximize profit, but only in a manner 
that increases consumer surplus. Figure 20 illustrates for the general situation of 
nonlinear demands. Suppose prices at the beginning of period tare at p'-1 • The 
I 1-1 
Laspeyres constraint for period t, p _1 • q p _1 ::;; 1 , dictates that the firm selects for p' ·q p' 
period t only those price vectors lying along, or beneath, the line containing pH that is 
tangent to the isosurplus curve through pH. Because of the convexity of this iso-surplus 
curve, any such price vector / selected by the firm will increase consumer surplus, i.e., 
v(p1 ) ~ v(pH). Hence, successive iterations of Laspeyres price cap regulation as 
applied to the consistently myopic firm can result only in a monotone increasing 
sequence of welfare levels because w(p1 )= v(p1 )+ 1r(p1 ). 
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P2 
p t-1 
. iso-profit 
curves 
Ii+ 
p' 
iso-surplus curve 
t-1 
---- through P 
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Figure 20. Laspeyres price cap regulation. 
4.2. Implications of Consumer Surplus for Strategic Behavior Under Laspeyres 
Price Cap Regulation 
We consider herein the question of whether it is possible for Laspeyres price cap 
regulation to be subject to the same type of strategic manipulation that we have shown to 
be associated with ARL regulation. We firstly assume that the pre-price cap regulation 
regime required that the firm operate at a price vector lying on the undominated portion 
of the zero-profit iso-profit curve. The undominated portion U of an iso-profit 
corresponds to the set of price vectors from which it is impossible to move to another 
price vector on the same iso-profit without increasing at least one of the market prices. In 
figure 21, the undominated portion of the illustrated iso-profit is the downward sloping 
segment extending from pA to pB. Under rate-of-return regulation it is reasonable to 
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assume that the regulator requires the zero-profit firm to operate in this region, for 
otherwise the firm is allowed to operate at a socially inefficient position - all prices could 
be cut without reducing the rate ofreturn. Hence, U is the only portion of the zero-profit 
iso-profit of interest to the regulator. 
Vectors in the plane of ordered price pairs that allow for immediate attainment of 
p • under Laspeyres regulation belong to the set A = {p I p • · q(p)::;; p · q(p )} . This set, 
whose boundary contains p • , is convex and lies above the isosurplus passing through 
p • . Therefore, it is possible for the firm to move directly to p • upon institution of 
Laspeyres regulation if An U is nonempty (assuming the pre-price cap price vector is in 
this intersection). While this possibility certainly exists in nonlinear cases (see figure 21), 
the following proposition claims that such possibility cannot exist with linear demands 
and constant marginal costs. 
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Figure 21. Nonlinear case allowing the possibility of immediate 
attainment of p • under Laspeyres price cap regulation. 
4.2.1. Proposition 7 
If the price vector assumed by a firm with linear demands and constant marginal 
costs before imposition of Laspeyres price cap regulation is in the undominated portion 
of the zero-profit iso-profit curve, the firm will not be able to assume the global profit 
maximum p • under Laspeyres price cap regulation. 
Proof of Proposition 7: 
Suppose a firm has demand vectors qi (pi)= aipi +bi, marginal costs c; for i = 1, 
2, and fixed cost F. By (8) the iso-profit locus for 1t = 0 is curve C represented by: 
C: (78) 
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Letting U represent the undominated portion of C implies: 
dp2 = 2a1Pt + b1 - a1c1 < 0 
dPt 2a2 p 2 + b2 - a2c2 
(79) 
for p in the interior of U. This is satisfied by the downward sloping portion of C 
A (b-ac) (b-ac) 
extending between p and pn where P1 = - 2 2 2 and P! = 1 1 1 • Now the 
2a2 2a1 
global profit maximum is by (9) p •=(-(bi - a1ci), - (b2 -a2ci)J, so the firm cannot 
2a1 .2a2 
move from a price vector p e U to p • while decreasing the price in a given market 
(figure 22). It follows that v(p ·) ~ V(p) for all p e U, and since consumer surplus under 
Laspeyres is monotone increasing over time for convex V, the firm cannot move from U 
• top . 
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Figure 22. Linear case disallowing the possibility of attainment of 
p • under Laspeyres price cap regulation. 
The above argument can be extended to the case of n markets where for each i = 
1, ... , n we have demand vectors qi (pi)= aiA + bi and marginal costs ci. More 
2 
generally, we need only stipulate that a 1C = 0 for i -::f:. j for the same result to obtain. 
BpjBPi 
The zero-profit iso-profit surface for linear demands and constant marginal costs will be 
radially symmetric about each axis i;i through p * and the zero-profit vector solving 
81C = 0. 
Bpi 
4.3. Strategic Behavior Under Laspeyres Price Cap Regulation Attaining p • 
Now because consumer surplus is monotone increasing under Laspeyres for 
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strictly convex V, it follows that a firm positioned at a price vector p contained in the set 
v(p * t = {p I v(p) > v(p * )} cannot attain the global profit maximum. However, the 
question of whether the firm can converge to p • from any price vector in 
v(p * t = {p I v(p) < v(p * )} but outside the convex set A (note A c v(p • t) is perhaps 
not so amenable to our intuition. The firm may find itself in v& * ) before imposition of 
Laspeyres regulation for reasons that here deserve brief consideration. Baumol, Fischer 
and ten Raa (1979) stress that fully distributed cost pricing may be called for by 
competitors of the regulated firm. As a result, the regulatory board may actually mandate 
an increase in the firm's prices to a dominated point on the zero-profit iso-profit locus. 
Additionally, Currier (2005) mentions that information asymmetries inherent in the 
regulatory procedure itself may induce the firm to fabricate cost data with the result that 
the regulatory board is deceived into believing that the undominated portion exists at 
artificially higher prices (i.e., above and to the right of its actual location). In such an 
event, the pre-Laspeyres regulated firm may be permitted to operate in v& * ) without 
the regulatory board's cognizance. For whatever reason the firm is permitted to price in 
v& *), the firm may eventually move to p * under Laspeyres regulation. To 
substantiate this possibility for the case of linear demands and constant marginal costs, 
we here utilize the justification for a familiar numerical method applied to the problem of 
approximating the solution to simple first-order initial value problems in ordinary 
differential equations. The method will be used to demonstrate the feasibility of 
convergence under Laspeyres from any price vector in V~ * ) to p • . 
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4.3.1. Proposition 8 
Assume a strictly convex consumer surplus function v(p1, p 2 ) that is C 2 in some 
open region R containing p0 = (P? ,p~) and for which av * 0 and 
Bp2 
8p2 8(A)2 BA 8PJ8p2 (p ) h h · 1---------1 is bounded for p = 1,Pi ER . T en t ere 1s a C1 > 0, (::, )' 
C2 > 0 for which p 0 , p 1 , ... , p 1 generated by the iteration: 
satisfy: 
av 
2 / __ 2 2) P = \Pi ,P2 = BA (Ff P1) Pl +h pl -h '2 i , 2 av 
Bp2 ( pf ,p1) 
av 
~ ) 8p1 {. 1-1 1-1) t t t t-I + h pt-I _ h \Pi , P2 P = 1 , P2 = P1 , 2 av 
Bp2 f . 1-1 1-1 ) \PI , P2 
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(80) 
(81) 
where pj is the price vector on the iso-surplus passing through p 0 satisfying 
J5/ = pf + jh, provided the iterates remain in R. 
Proof of Proposition 8: 
We appeal here to a theorem we will call Euler's tangent line theorem (Leader 
2004). Appendix E presents a statement of this theorem and how it is adapted to the 
discussion that follows. The "solution" curve is the iso-surplus that passes through the 
price vector p 0 • Along this curve in the region R we may consider p 2 to be a variable 
av 
dependent on Pt because V is strictly convex. The function /{p1, p 2 ) = - : , which 
8p2 
is continuously differentiable with respect to Pt and p 2 in R, gives us the slopes of 
nearby iso-surplus curves used to construct the polygonal approximation of the solution 
curve. Also, Bf is bounded for p = (p1, p2 ) e R . The absolute error associated with 
8Pt 
Euler's approximation atj steps forward from p 0 is bounded by hCi (eCzjh -1) where h 
is the step size. 
4.3.2. An Implication of Proposition 8 
Recall that for any given}, p/ =pf+ jh. Consequently (81) yields: 
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(82) 
as a bound for the absolute error. We now write (82) as: 
(83) 
c(-j o) . 
where M = e 2 Pi -p; -1. Now let pl represent a fixed pA on the iso-surplus through 
p 0 • Reducing the step size h does not affect M. However, the value of j that identifies 
p( with p: is increased. Reducing the step size requires more steps to get from P? to 
p:. At any rate, (83) tells us that the error associated with approximating the solution 
curve at pA by the polygon decreases as O(h) (i.e., the error bound is proportional to h). 
Hence we can make it as small as desired. This, of course, is a well known property of 
Euler's method. 
4.3.3. Corollary to Proposition 8 
Assume a consumer surplus function v(p) satisfying the hypothesis of 
Proposition 8. Also define v(p * t = {p I V(p) < v(p * )} and A = {p I p • · q(p) ~ p · q(p )} . 
The firm under Laspeyres price cap regulation may attain p • starting from any price 
vector p0 E v(p' t -A within a finite number of time intervals. 
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Proof of Corollary to Proposition 8: 
Let p O e v(p • t -A . Also let pA = (pt, P1) be the price vector satisfying 
Pt = p; and v(pA )= V(p 0 ). Therefore, pA is the price vector on the iso-surplus curve 
through p 0 that is directly above p 0 (V(pA )= v(p0 )< v(p· )). Observe that pA e A. 
Beginning at p 0 , generate the sequence of price vectors p 1, p 2 , ••• , p' by use of 
(80). Each p 1, p 2 , ••• , p' may be considered to have been produced by the Laspeyres 
price cap scheme starting at the initial price vector p 0 • To see this, observe that 
~t - pt-l ). vv~t-l )= 0 for all t. An iteration of Euler's method is a Laspeyres 
movement. Let p(pA; h) represent the price vector immediately below pA on the 
polygonal approximation resulting from a step size of h. The vertical distance between 
this point and pA is the truncation error E(pA;h) (see figure 23). Now since Euler's 
method is O(h), there exists an h > 0 sufficiently small making E{pA;h)< IP1 - p;,. 
Selecting such a value for h forces p(pA; h) e A when pA is in A because A is convex. 
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P2 
iso-surplus 
curves 
convex set A 
A • 
A=A 
• p 
Figure 23. For sufficiently small h, Euler's polygonal approximation of the 
iso-surplus curve through p 0 and pA passes between p • and pA. 
4.3.4. An Example of Strategic Behavior Under Laspeyres Attaining p • as a Steady 
State Within a Finite Number of Periods 
When given linear demands qi (pi)= aipi + b1 and constant marginal costs ci for 
i = 1, 2, the hypothesis of Proposition 8 are satisfied by the associated consumer surplus 
function, and the iteration formula (80) takes the form: 
Pt = f t pt)= (pt-I+ h pt-I -h aipf-I + /Ji J \Pb 2 I ' 2 t-I . 
a2P2 +bi 
(84) 
To illustrate Euler's method here, consider again the linear demand functions 
q 1 = -5 Pi + 20 and q 2 = -6 p2 + 40 , but now under Laspeyres price cap regulation. For 
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cost function C = q1 + 3q2 + 16.1369 we have a global profit maximum at 
p* = (2.5000, 4.8333). Now the price vector p 0 = (1.742, 5.875) belongs to the set 
v(p • t -A . We demonstrate that the firm may be able to move from p O to p • in a finite 
number of periods. 
Let p A be the price vector directly above p • that is on the same iso-surplus curve 
as p 0. So pA = (2.5000, 4.9345). Since demand functions are linear in prices, and 
marginal costs are constant, (84) should give a sequence of feasible price vectors that 
enters the convex set A provided a small enough value for h is chosen. It turns out that 
h = 0.758 is the largest such value that will allow for a price vector p1 in the sequence 
satisfying both pf = p; = pf and p; ::; p~ < pf . With this value for h, five iterations 
are necessary to produce the desired p1 . A computer generated graph of several iso-
surplus curves (including the one through p • and the one through p 0 and pA ), iso-profit 
curves, and the approximating polygon appear in figure 24. The polygon intersects the 
boundary of A at the point (2.2828, 5.0223). Once inside the set A, the firm can assume 
p • in the very next period. 
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0 
iso-surplus curve through P 
border of convex 
set A 
p 2 = (2.0452, 5.2837) 
p 3 = (2.1968, 5.1051) 
Figure 24. Sequence of Laspeyres price cap vectors generated by Euler's 
tangent line method for demands q1 = -5 Pt + 20, q2 = -6p2 + 40, and cost 
C=q1 +3q2 +16.1369. 6 
6 Graph generated by use of the computer algebra system Derive. 
96 
4.3.5. Strategic Behavior Under Laspeyres Given n Markets 
We can extend Euler's method to multiple dimensions to consider the possibility 
of a firm moving from p O e V~ *) -A to p * under Laspeyres in a finite number of 
steps when given n markets. Assume a consumer surplus function V resulting from 
independent linear product demand functions of the form qi(pi) = a;P; + b;. It follows 
that V is C 2 and strictly convex in Rn . As a result, sufficiently small h" h2 , ... , hn-I 
exist whereby the iteration formula: 
av av av 
1-1 p 
t = 1, 2, ... (85) 
provides a sequence of price vectors that eventually enters the set A. To see this, let pA 
be the unique price vector on the iso-surplus surface through p O satisfying pf = p; for 
all i = 1, 2, ... , n-1. Consider now the curve rp connecting p 0 with pA that is geodesic7 
in the iso-surplus surface containing po and pA (see figure 25). Along the projection of 
this curve in the Pi, Pn -plane, which we label rp;, we have Pn as a convex function of 
7 A curve is geodesic between po and pA ifit is the shortest of all possible curves connecting these 
points and is contained within the surface. 
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Pi . We can approximate <pi with a planar polygon beginning at ~?,<pi~?)) so that the 
truncation error associated with estimating P1 = <pi (pf) is O(h). The slope field 
required for Euler's method here is obtained by projecting then-dimensional slope field 
for V into the pi, p n -plane. Independence between the product demand functions 
ensures that the projected field is well-defined and gives the slope of <pi (P;). 8 
Accordingly, the slope field in the Pi, Pn-plane will satisfy 
av 
Bpi 
av 
Bpn (o, ... ,p; ,o, ... ,p") 
d2Pn 
. Ifin every Pi, Pn-plane --2- is bounded, then 
dpi 
the tangent line method may be applied. For each market i we can select a step size fl; 
av 
~ ) - - Bpi ( t-I t-I) for use in pt = ,r ,Pnt = p~-I + h· pt-I -h· \f; 'P'!. 
l ,, n l av 
Bpn I (-I 1-1) \.P, , Pn 
so that the truncation 
error E;{~f ,P1 ); h;) of the polygon in the Pi, Pn-plane is less than IP1 - p:,. Finally, 
{I A 01 I A 01 I A O '} PI - P1 P2 - P2 Pn-1 - Pn-1 letting M = Max - , - ,. · ·, - and subsequently defining 
h1 h2 hn-1 
Pi -pi I A 01 
hi = for all i = 1, 2, ... , n -1 will estimate the geodesic curve by a polygon 
M 
8 Independence is a reasonable assumption in many cases. The example offered by Brennan (1989) oflong-
distance telephone illustrates. The demand for calling city A from city B is not likely to be too sensitive to 
the demand for calling city C. Brennan claims that where demands are interdependent, the elasticities can 
be replaced with "superelasticities" (Brock 1983) that embody zero cross-elasticities. 
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whose projection in any p j, Pi -plane is the line connecting the projection of p O with 
the projection of pA . Moreover, the resulting pt generated by (85) after M iterations 
will have a truncation error at pA less than lpf -p:1. 
Pj 
Pn 
Pj, Pi 
planar 
projection 
of q, 
* p 
tangent line 
A * Pi = Pi 
Pi 
truncation 
error 
E;(~f,P!) h;} 
geodesic curve q, in iso-surplus 
0 A 
surface connecting P and P 
Figure 25. Tangent line approximation of Pi, Pn -planar projection ( q,i) of 
geodesic curve. 
We can verify that (85) does in fact give a Laspeyres movement inn-space by 
· th d · · 1· av /aPi qi d · 1 · d F notmg at Roy's I entity imp 1es = - urmg any regu atory per10 . rom 
av/apn qn 
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(85) then we obtain: 
( 
t-1 t-l t-l J t t-l ql q2 qn-1 P =p - h1--+h2--+ .. ·+h 1--n n t-l t-l n- t-l 
qn qn qn 
(86) 
thus giving: 
( 
t-1 t-l t-1 J ql q2 qn-l t t-1 h1--+h2--+ .. ·+h 1-- +p -p =0 t-l t-l n- t-l n n 
qn qn qn 
(87) 
which implies: 
(88) 
and thus: 
(89) 
So that finally: 
I t t-1 t t-1 t t-1) I t-1 t-1 t t) \P1 -pl ,P2 -p2 ,···,Pn-Pn ·\qI ,q2 ,"·,qn-l'qn 
= ~t _ pt-l )-l-1 = 0. (90) 
It is this author's conviction that an approximation scheme similar to that of (85) 
applies even when independence between demands cannot be assumed. The geometric 
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problem of estimating a geodesic curve within a convex iso-surplus surface by a polygon 
remams. 
The firm may actually favor the incremental approach for modifying its prices as 
detailed above because of the potential for increasing the present value of its profit stream 
over the anticipated periods of the regulatory regime. In a similar vein, Sappington 
(1980) observes that for a one-product firm expecting imposition ofV-F regulation, a 
natural strategy of forgoing short-term profits over multiple regulatory periods by 
expending resources on unproductive inputs (i.e., waste) with an aim to relaxing the 
regulatory constraint in subsequent periods will likewise produce such behavior. More 
precisely, he demonstrates that with higher rates of discounting, the V-F regulated firm 
should choose to waste over a greater number of periods; In the extreme case when the 
discount factor f3 equals 1.00, the firm will actually elect to waste over all periods of the 
regime. As V-F regulation is quite similar in form to Laspeyres in that the period t 
constraint line is simply the line tangent to the iso-suplus curve passing through the 
previous period's price vector, it seems reasonable that Sappington's logic should apply 
to the Laspeyres regulated firm. It is only because the firm values future profits that it 
will sacrifice present profits in the manner prescribed by (85). Conceivably, a Laspeyres 
regulated firm beginning at a non-global profit-maximizing price vector in V~ * f -A 
would decide to depart any polygonal path leading to p * in the face of a sufficiently 
small value for f3. Alternatively, if the firm begins in V~ *), f3 is very close to 1.00, 
and many regulatory periods are anticipated, then while p * is unattainable the firm may 
yet move on very short linear segments that together comprise a nearly smooth path 
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which more closely approximiates the iso-surplus curve through po. Not surprisingly, 
the discount factor p has direct implications on Laspeyres regulation performance for 
profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare. 
A potential lesson for regulators exists here. Regulators should beware of small 
Laspeyres movements. Although to protect consumers regulators often place upper limits 
on the size of allowed price changes under a price cap to protect consumers from 
dramatic price swings,9 it nevertheless follows from the discussion here that there may be 
good rationale for forbidding too many small price changes as well. A firm that moves 
from period to period in such a way that it remains close to the iso-surplus curve passing 
through the initial price vector po essentially over time appropriates almost all of the 
welfare increase to itself as profits. If the firm may select the step size as small as it 
wishes, then it can effectively place an arbitrarily low upper bound on the increase in 
consumer surplus. 
4.4. Myopic Behavior Under Laspeyres Price Cap Regulation 
The profit-maximizing firm in period t of Laspeyres regulation will move from 
price vector p'-1 to price vector p' satisfying: 
vv(p1- 1 } = r'V 1r(p1 ) 
vv(p'-1 )· (p' - Pt-I)= o. 
(91) 
(92) 
9 Typically, pricing bands restrict prices in each market to deviate in any period by no more than a certain 
percentage from their levels at the beginning of the period. See Sappington's article in Cave, Majumdar, 
and Vogelsang (2002) for a discussion on pricing bands. 
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For demand vectors qJyi) = a;P; + b;, and marginal costs c; for i = 1, 2, (91) and (92) 
imply: 
(93) 
r ,-1 b X , ,-1 ) r ,-1 b X , ,-1 ) 0 \01Pi + I PJ - PJ + \02P2 + 2 P2 - P2 = (94) 
Now under linear demands and constant marginal costs, if the firm initially prices at 
p O e v(p • Y - A and behaves myopically in the first period of regulation, it will not be 
able to attain p • in any subsequent period of regulation. In other words, to attain p • 
from p0 E v(p • Y -A the firm must behave strategically beginning at the very first 
opportunity to do so. This follows from the convexity of the iso-surplus curves. The 
solution p1 = (p:, p~) to (91) and (92) where p'-1 e v(p • Y -A must be in the set 
v(p * Y because vv~t-I ). ~ * - p1-1 )< 0. For linear demands and constant marginal 
costs, strategic behavior following myopic behavior may lead the firm to a price vector 
corresponding to a higher profit than that resulting from consistently myopic behavior, 
but this price vector cannot be p • . If p • is unattainable in period 1, then myopic 
behavior during any subsequent period precludes eventual attainment of p • . This 
presents an important difference between Average-Revenue-Lagged and Laspeyres 
regulation, for with ARL we have seen that even consistently myopic behavior performed 
over multiple periods can inevitably lead to p • (see Proposition 3). 
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4.5. Firm Behavior In Anticipation of Laspeyres Price Cap Regulation in the Face 
of a Positive Discount Factor 
Law (1997) demonstrates that the convex set A described previously is actually a 
limiting case for a family of convex sets applicable to a monopolist's pricing behavior in 
a simple two-period model in which the firm correctly anticipates that it will be subject to 
Laspeyres price-cap regulation in the second period. Strategic pricing occurs in the period 
before the cap is imposed when the firm is unregulated. For the two-market case with 
linear, independent, time-invariant demands and constant marginal costs, the profit-
maximizing firm will select period 1 prices satisfying: 
(95) 
where O = (( + L 2 ~), given discount factor P , Laspeyres index reduction cap L (i.e., L 
l+LP 
I t-1 
satisfies p _1 • q p _1 ~ L ) and that O < L < 8 < 1 .10 The set A actually corresponds to p' ·q p' 
L = 8 = 1 in (95), but for smaller values of 8 and still smaller corresponding values of 
L , the strategic period 1 price vector set is represented graphically by elliptically-shaped 
closed curves passing through the price vectors ~; Io, p; Io), (- !)_, - !!l_J and 
a1 a2 
centered at the midpoint between these two price vectors (figure 26). Law verifies that 
since the period 1 ellipse corresponding to 8 is tangent to the iso-surplus curve passing 
through ~;Io, p; Io) at this price vector, then certain welfare consequences under 
10 Law obtains this result by maximizing with respect to prices a Lagrangian expression involving 
discounted profits ( objective function) subject to the Laspeyres constraint. 
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Laspeyres necessarily follow from the firm's ability to adjust price relatives and period 1 
revenue shares for the markets. In contrast to optimal pricing under Uniform Regulation 
(UR) which requires Pt ::::; Lpf and therefore provides a natural benchmark of 
comparison with no opportunities for strategic manipulation, strategic manipulation of 
market weights under Laspeyres with identical index reduction cap L lowers consumer 
surplus ( at least in period 1) and raises producer welfare. The potential for consumer 
surplus in period 2 to be lower under Laspeyres than under UR derives from the fact that 
the necessary condition for optimum period 2 prices: 
and the iso-surplus curve through the period 2 UR prices have unequal slopes at the 
period 2 UR prices where they intersect. Finally, social welfare may be lower under 
Laspeyres than under UR. 
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(96) 
<5 = 0.60 
<5 = 0.80 
convex set A ( <5 = 1.00 ) 
/ 
....__ 
uniform regulation prices 
* iso-surplus curve through P 
Figure 26. Optimum period 1 price vector sets when Laspeyres price cap 
regulation is correctly anticipated for period 2. 
4.6. Comparison of Average-Revenue Lagged to Laspeyres Price Cap Regulation 
We have discussed the possibility of strategic behavior leading to the global profit 
maximum for both ARL and L regulation when product demands are linear and marginal 
costs are constant (provided p* ~ p0 for ARL, and the initial price vector belongs to the 
set v(p • t -A for L). However, while strategic behavior under ARL can be commenced 
during later periods of regulation, strategic behavior under Laspeyres, to be effective in 
achieving p ·, must be initiated during the very first period of regulation. Further, 
strategic behavior under Laspeyres may necessarily involve several regulatory periods, 
whereas strategic behavior under ARL need involve only two periods of regulation. If the 
firm can perform strategically only under the guise that it is acting myopically, then of 
course Laspeyres is a superior regulatory scheme because the regulator has a greater 
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opportunity to scrutinize the behavior of the firm. Under both regimes, marginal cost 
values reported by the firm in any period constrain the firm in what price vectors it can 
select during subsequent periods. If several periods are required before the firm can 
achieve an ulterior objective, then the firm may not be able to pull off its strategy simply 
because the regulator becomes wise to the firm's intentions. 
Additionally, we have observed how consistently myopic behavior under ARL 
can inevitably lead to the global profit maximum. Consistently myopic behavior under 
Laspeyres, however, must lead to a price vector of lower profit and higher consumer 
surplus than those at p • , if begun at any price vector outside of the convex set A. 
Moreover, while consumer surplus under ARL will increase once before decreasing 
steadily to a value less than that associated with the initial price vector; consumer surplus, 
firm profit, and consequently social welfare are monotone increasing throughout under 
myopic behavior within Laspeyres. As we have considered it necessary to suggest 
corrective mechanisms to interpose within ARL for the purpose of ensuring against 
erosion of welfare (see Sections 3.2.1. and 3.2.2.), no such mechanisms are needed in 
Laspeyres regulation. Table 2 presents a summary of these results. For these reasons and 
others adduced in Chapters 2 and 3, it appears that Laspeyres is superior to ARL as a 
regulatory scheme designed for furthering the typical objectives of public oversight 
authorities. 
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A comparison of some properties of Average-Revenue-Lagged and Laspeyres 
regulation for linear product demands and constant marginal costs. 
A verage-Revenue-La1rn:ed Laspeyres 
Strategic Behavior Requires only two periods May require many periods. 
to achieve the global profit 
maximum p * if Ji* ::;; p0 • 
Can be commenced in any Must be commenced in 
period. period 1 to achieve the 
global profit maximum p •. 
Myopic Behavior Can still lead to the global Cannot lead to the global 
profit maximum if 15* ::;; p0 • profit maximum if begun 
outside of the convex set A. 
Consumer Surplus Increases in the first period Increases monotonically 
then decreases below that under strategic and 
for p O under strategic and consistently myopic 
consistently myopic behavior. 
behavior 
Welfare Can decrease over time. Increases monotonically 
under strategic and 
Policy recommendations consistently myopic 
necessary. behavior. 
Table 2 
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APPENDIX A 
The standard form equation for an ellipse centered at the point (h, k) is 
(x - 2h )2 + (y-2k )2 = 1 where a is half the length of the horizontal axis and b is half the 
a b 
length of the vertical axis. The eccentricity of an ellipse is given by the quotient e = % 
where c (the distance from the center to either focus) satisfies c = ~la2 - b2 1. Two 
ellipses whose equations are identical except for the constant term are therefore of the 
same eccentricity. 
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APPENDIXB 
The components of the price vector (f, Ji° ) can be expressed in terms of the 
parameters of the demand and cost functions (i.e., a1, a2 , b1, b2 , c1, and c2 ). The average 
revenue for p * is given by: 
(97) 
So since q; = a;P; + b;, i = 1, 2, we have: 
(98) 
which from (9) yields: 
(99) 
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APPENDIXC 
This property can be easily verified by noting that an ellipse is concentric and of 
identical eccentricity and orientation with another ellipse (x - 2h )2 + (y - 2k )2 = I only if 
a b 
its equation can be written in the form ((t: ;)' + (y(t~ ;)' =I. Translating both so that 
x2 2 2 2 
their centers are (h, k) = ( 0,0) gives the equations - 2 +-=;- = I and (x )2 + (y )2 = 1. So 
a b ta th 
2 2 
if the ray y = mx intersects ;-+ -=;- = I at the point ( x1, y 1) then it intersects 
a b 
2 2 2 2 
1 x )2 + (y)2 = I at the point (tx"tyi). Now the slope of a line tangent to ;- +-=;-=I at ~ ~ a b 
d I b2 X1 x2 y2 (x" Yi) is -1:'. = - ~ Yi and the slope of a line tangent to (ta)2 + (tb)2 = I at 
dx (x1,Yd 
b 2 tx b2 X I I 
=-------
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APPENDIXD 
Since under ARL the period t constraint must be perpendicular to VV(p 1- 1 ), the 
firm operating with the linear demands qi (pi)= aipi + bi and constant marginal costs ci 
may obtain the period t profit maximizing price vector p' by solving: 
(100) 
and thus obtaining: 
-
2(a1)2 azCp:-1)2 po+ a1p:-1(a2pt1(2a2po -c2a2 + b2) + 2a2fio(2b1 + b2)-b2 (c2a2 -
2((a1)2a2(P:-1)2 + 
-
-b2 )) + (a2 )2 (pt1 )2 (c1a1 -b1) + a2pt1 (2a2b1p 0 + 2c1a1b2 -b1 (c2a2 +bi))+ 2a2 -
2a1a2b1P:-1 +a1(a2)2(Pt1)2 +2a1a2b2P~-1 +a1(b2)2 +az(bi)2 
b1p0 (b1 +b2)+b2(c1a1b2 -c2a2b1) 
• l 
and 
p~ = 
(101) 
-(a1)2(p;-1)2(c2a2 -b2) + a1p:-\a2Pt1(2a1J5o -c1a1 + b1) + 2a1b2Po -c1a1b2 + b1 (-
2((a1)2 a2 (P:-1)2 + 
116 
2c2a2 -b2)) + 2a1 (a2)2(p~-1)2 p0 + a2pt1(2a1p0 (b1 + 2bi)-b1 (c1a1 -b1)) + 2a1 
2a1a2h1P:-1 +a/a2)2(pt1)2 +2a1a2h2Pt1 +a1(bi)2 +a2(b1)2) 
b2p0(b1 +b2)-b1(c1a1b2 -c2a2b1) 
· 1 
117 
(102) 
Euler's Method: 
For the initial value problem: 
y' = f(x,y) 
y(xo)= Yo 
the iterates: 
YI= Yo+ hf(xo,Yo) 
Y2 = YI + hf(xi, YI) 
Yn = Yn-I + hf(xn-1,Yn-d 
APPENDIXE 
is known as Euler's Method. Correspondingly, we have the following theorem as 
presented by Leader (2004). The proof is contained in his text and in any standard 
numerical analysis text: 
Let y(x) be the solution of y' = J(x, y), y(x0 ) = Yo. If f (x, y) is continuously 
differentiable with respect to both its independent variables in some open region R 
containing (x0 , Yo), and IY"(x ~ is bounded for x within R, then there is an A > 0, B > 0 
for which the iterates y 0 , Yi, ... , Yn generated by Euler's method satisfy 
ly(x; )- Yi!::;; hA(eBih -1), provided the iterates and the solution y(x) remain in R. 
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